# Lecture 8: Labour economics 

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Lars Calmfors

## Technological progress

- Labour productivity growth
- Capitalisation effect increases the profit due to job creation.
- The individual's productivity $y$ grows at the rate $g$.
- Assume a balanced growth path where productivity, the real wage and profits all increase at the rate of $g$.
$\pi_{e}=$ profit from a filled vacancy (discounted value)
$\pi_{V}=$ profit from an unfilled vacancy (discounted value)

$$
\begin{align*}
& \pi_{e}=\frac{1}{1+r d t}\left[(y-w) d t+q d t(1+g d t) \pi_{v}+(1-q d t)\right] \\
& (1+g d t) \pi_{e}  \tag{3}\\
& \boldsymbol{q}=\text { rate of job destruction }
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (3) can be rewritten:

$$
\begin{align*}
& (r-g) \pi_{e}=(y-w)+q(1+g d t)\left(\pi_{V}-\pi_{e}\right) \\
& d t \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \\
& (r-g) \pi_{e}=(y-w)+q\left(\pi_{V}-\pi_{e}\right) \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

- If $\pi_{e}$ is "invested" in the labour market it earns a return made up of the instantaneous profit $(y-w)$ and an expected "capital gain" $q\left(\pi_{V}-\pi_{e}\right)$.
- In addition the value of the asset has risen by $q \pi_{e}$.
- A financial investment yields $r \pi_{e}$.
- $(r-g) \pi_{e}$ is the return from a financial investment less the "opportunity cost" $g \pi_{e}$ in an environment characterized by growth $g$.
- $(r-g) \pi_{e}$ is the effective rate of return on an investment.
- Growth is accompanied by a capitalisation effect equivalent to a reduction in the interest rate.
- The cost of a vacancy is assumed to be indexed to productivity, i.e. it is hy.


## The return from an unfilled vacancy

$$
\begin{equation*}
(r-g) \pi_{v}=-h y+m(\theta)\left(\pi_{e}-\pi_{v}\right) \tag{4a}
\end{equation*}
$$

The free-entry condition $\pi_{v}=\mathbf{0}$ together with (4) and (4a) give:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{y-w}{r-g+q}=\frac{h y}{m(\theta)} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The expected profit from a filled job, $\pi_{e}$, is equal to the average cost of a vacancy, hy/m( $\theta$ ).

- (5) represents labour demand.
- $g \uparrow \Rightarrow L H S \uparrow \Rightarrow \pi_{e} \uparrow$
- Hence, the RHS, the cost of an unfilled vacancy, must also go up. This occurs if the average duration of a vacancy $1 / m(\theta)$ increases, which happens when labour market tightness increases.
- Hence, $g \uparrow \Rightarrow \theta \uparrow$, i.e. an upward shift of the labour demand schedule.


Figure 10.1
The effect of an increase in productivity.

## Wage setting

$V_{e}=$ the discounted expected utility of an employed worker
$V_{u}=$ the discounted expected utility of an unemployed worker

$$
\begin{equation*}
(r-g) V_{e}=w+q\left(V_{u}-V_{e}\right) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

We assume that the income of an unemployed worker is indexed to productivity, such that it is zy.

Then:

$$
\begin{equation*}
(r-g) V_{u}=z y+\theta m(\theta)\left(V_{e}-V_{u}\right) \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Apply the same wage bargaining model as in chapter 9, but change $z$ to $z y$ and $r$ to ( $r-g$ ).

Equation (20) in chapter 9 can then be rewritten:

$$
\begin{align*}
& w=y[z+(1-z) \Gamma(\theta)] \\
& \Gamma(\theta)=\frac{\gamma[r-g+q+\theta m(\theta)]}{r-g+q+\gamma \theta m(\theta)} \tag{8}
\end{align*}
$$

- The "strength of the employee in bargaining", $\Gamma(\theta)$, increases with $g$.
- $g \uparrow$ reduces the effective interest rate.
- The "capital loss" from job destruction is reduced.
- Hence, less fear of unemployment.
- WC curve is shifted upwards.


## From Figure 10.1

A rise in productivity growth:
(i) raises the wage
(ii) has an ambiguous effect on $\theta$.

But (5) and (8) together give:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-z)}{r-g+q+\gamma \theta m(\theta)}=\frac{h}{m(\theta)} \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Differentiation of (9) shows that rise in $\boldsymbol{g}$ raises $\boldsymbol{\theta}$.

$$
\frac{d \theta}{d g}=\frac{h}{h \gamma \underbrace{[\underbrace{m(\theta)+\theta m^{\prime}(\theta)}]}_{(+)} \underbrace{-(1-\gamma)(1-z) m^{\prime}(\theta)}_{(+)}}>0
$$


$\theta \uparrow \Rightarrow u \downarrow$

Intuition: The profit from a filled job increases also after the effect on wage bargaining has been taken account of.

- Productivity growth makes job creation more profitable.
- Note that the effect is associated with higher productivity growth, not with a one-shot increase in the productivity level.
- Limitation: Exogenous rate of job destruction $q$.
- But if $q=q(g)^{(+)}$, then the effect on unemployment is not à priori clear!

Table 10.2
Evolution of the D5/D1 ratio among men in the 1980s and 1990 s.

| Country | $1975-79$ | $1995-96$ | $1975-79$ to $1995-96$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Australia | 1.57 | 1.68 | 0.11 |
| Canada $^{\star}$ | 2.07 | 2.22 | 0.15 |
| France $^{\text {Germany }}$ | 1.68 | 1.60 | -0.08 |
| Japan | 1.52 | 1.46 | -0.06 |
| Sweden | 1.58 | 1.60 | 0.02 |
| United Kingdom | 1.32 | 1.40 | 0.08 |
| United States | 1.58 | 1.80 | 0.22 |

Source: Bertola et al. (2001, table 3).

* Periods 1980-1984 and 1990-1994.
$\dagger$ The first period is 1980-1984.

Table 10.3
Evolution of unemployment rates per skill level between 1981 and 1996.

| Country | $u_{l}$ |  | $\Delta u_{l}$ | $u_{h}$ |  | $\Delta u_{h}$ | $\Delta u_{\ell}-\Delta u_{h}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1981 | 1996 |  | 1981 | 1996 |  |  |
| Canada | 7.3 | 13.4 | 6.1 | 2.0 | 6.6 | 4.6 | 1.5 |
| France | 5.4 | 13.0 | 7.6 | 3.0 | 5.9 | 2.9 | (4.7) |
| Sweden | 3.0 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 0.6 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 2.7 |
| United Kingdom | 13.7 | 15.1 | 1.4 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 1.4 | 0 |
| United States | 10.3 | 11.0 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 |

Source: OECD data and personal calculations.
Note: $u_{l}$ designates the unemployment rate of individuals with low educational levels (secondary school education not completed). $u_{h}$ designates the unemployment rate of individuals with high educational levels (college or university training). $\Delta$ designates the difference between 1996 and 1981.

Table 10.4
The evolution of employment rates per skill level between 1981 and 1996.

|  | $e_{\ell}$ |  |  | $e_{h}$ |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | 1981 | 1996 |  | $\Delta e_{\ell}$ | 1981 | 1996 | $\Delta e_{h}$ | $\Delta e_{\ell}-\Delta e_{h}$ |
| Canada | 79.6 | 64.3 |  | -15.3 | 74.6 | 84.7 | -9.9 | -5.4 |
| France | 80.3 | 67.2 |  | -12.8 | 92.5 | 87.4 | -5.1 | -7.7 |
| Sweden | 85.3 | 73.5 |  | -12.2 | 95.2 | 93.1 | -2.1 | -10.1 |
| United Kingdom | 71.7 | 61.7 | -10 | 91.3 | 88.8 | -2.5 | -7.5 |  |
| United States | 69.8 | 66.1 |  | -3.7 | 91.8 | 90.5 | -1.3 | -2.4 |

Source: OECD data and personal calculations.
Note: $e_{\ell}$ designates the employment rate of individuals with low educational levels (secondary school education not completed). $e_{h}$ designates the employment rate of individuals with high educational levels (college or university training). $\Delta$ designates the difference between 1996 and 1981.

## The Anglo-Saxon vs the European model

- Biased technological progress
- Two labour markets: skilled and unskilled labour
- Three goods
- final good
- two intermediate goods (one produced with skilled labour; one produced with unskilled labour)
- Each employee produces one intermediate good per unit of time.

Production of the final good
$F\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} L_{l}\right) \quad A_{h}$ and $L_{h}$ measure the levels of technical progress

- The market for the final good is perfectly competitive.
$\underset{L_{h}, L_{l}}{\operatorname{Max}} \quad F\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} L_{l}\right)-p_{h} L_{h}-p_{L} L_{L}$
$p_{i}=A_{i} F_{i}\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} L_{l}\right) \quad i=h, l$
$\frac{p_{h}}{p_{l}}=\frac{A_{h} F_{h}\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} L_{l}\right)}{A_{l} F_{l}\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} L_{l}\right)}$

Stationary state
$r \pi_{i}=p_{i}-w_{i}+q_{i}\left(\pi_{V i}-\pi_{i}\right)$
$h_{i}=\operatorname{cost}$ of a vacancy
$\theta_{i}=V_{i} / U_{i}=$ labour market tightness
$m\left(\theta_{i}\right)=M_{i}\left(V_{i} / U_{i}\right) / V_{i}=$ the rate at which vacant jobs of type $i$ are filled

$$
\begin{equation*}
r \pi_{V i}=-h_{i}+m_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)\left(\pi_{i}-\pi_{V i}\right) \tag{40}
\end{equation*}
$$

From free-entry condition $\pi_{v i}=0$, (39) and (40) we have:
$\frac{h_{i}}{m\left(\theta_{i}\right)}=\frac{p_{i}-w_{i}}{r+q_{i}}$

## Wage negotiations

$Z_{i}=$ income of an unemployed person
$V_{e i}=$ discounted utility of an employed $\boldsymbol{i}$ worker
$V_{u i}=$ discounted utility of an unemployed $\boldsymbol{i}$ worker
$r V_{e i}=w_{i}+q_{i}\left(V_{u i}-V_{e i}\right)$
$r V_{u i}=z_{i}+\theta_{i} m\left(\theta_{i}\right)\left(V_{e i}-V_{u i}\right)$

From eq. (20) in chapter 9
$w_{i}=z_{i}+\left(p_{i}-z_{i}\right) \Gamma_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)$
$\Gamma_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\theta_{i}\right)=\frac{\gamma_{i}\left[r+q_{i}+\theta_{i} m\left(\theta_{i}\right)\right]}{r+q_{i}+\gamma_{i} \theta_{i} m\left(\theta_{i}\right)}$

$$
i=h, l
$$

$z_{i}=b_{i} w_{i}$
$h_{i}=h p_{i}$
$w_{i}=b_{i} w_{i}+\left(p_{i}-b_{i} w_{i}\right) \Gamma_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)$
$w_{i}=p_{i} \Phi\left(\theta_{i}\right) \quad \Phi\left(\theta_{i}\right)=\frac{\Gamma_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)}{1-b_{i}+b_{i} \Gamma_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)} \quad i=1,2$
(41) and (42a) give:
$\frac{h}{m_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)}=\frac{1-\Phi_{i}\left(\theta_{i}\right)}{r+q_{i}}$

- Labour market tightness is independent of the prices of the intermediate goods and thus of technological progress.
- Hence, unemployment from the Beveridge curve does not depend on technological progress (bias).
- But the relative wage $w_{l} / w_{h}$ does depend on technological bias (prices).
- This is an Anglo-Saxon labour market.


## A European labour market

- Unskilled workers are paid a minimum wage.
- Assumption: The minimum wage is indexed to the wage of skilled workers.

$$
w_{l}=\mu w_{h}=\mu p_{h} \Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right) \quad 0 \leq \mu \leq 1
$$

$$
\frac{h_{l}}{m\left(\theta_{l}\right)}=\frac{p_{l}-w_{l}}{r+q_{l}}=\frac{p_{l}-\mu p_{h} \Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right)}{r+q_{l}}
$$

$$
\frac{h P_{l}}{m\left(\theta_{l}\right)}=\frac{p_{l}-\mu p_{h} \Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right)}{r+q_{l}}
$$

$$
\frac{h}{m\left(\theta_{l}\right)}=\frac{1-\mu \frac{p_{h}}{p_{l}} \Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right)}{r+q_{l}}
$$

- Obviously $\theta_{l}$ is affected by a change in $p_{h} / p_{l}$ due to technological bias.
- $\theta_{h}$ is determined as in the Anglo-Saxon model and is not affected by technological bias.
- It follows that relative unemployment is affected by technological bias.


## CES production function

$$
\begin{align*}
& F\left(A_{h} L_{h}, A_{l} F_{l}\right)=\left[\left(A_{h} L_{h}\right)^{(\sigma-1) / \sigma}+\left(A_{l} L_{l}\right)^{(\sigma-1) / \sigma}\right]^{\sigma(\sigma-1)} \\
& \frac{p_{h}}{p_{l}}=\left(\frac{A_{h}}{A_{l}}\right)^{(\sigma-1) / \sigma}\left(\frac{L_{h}}{L}\right)^{-1 / \sigma} \tag{46}
\end{align*}
$$

## Anglo-Saxon model

$$
\frac{w_{h}}{w_{l}}=\left(\frac{A_{h}}{A_{l}}\right)^{(\sigma-1) / \sigma}\left[\frac{N_{h}\left(1-u_{h}\right)}{N_{l}\left(1-u_{l}\right)}\right]^{-1 / \sigma} \quad \frac{\Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right)}{\Phi_{l}\left(\theta_{l}\right)}
$$

## European labour market

(46) together with $L_{i}=N_{i}\left(1-u_{i}\right)$ and

$$
\frac{h_{l}}{m_{l}\left(\theta_{l}\right)}=\frac{p_{l}-w_{l}}{r+q_{l}}
$$

gives:

$$
\frac{h\left(r+q_{l}\right)}{m_{l}\left(\theta_{l}\right)}=1-\mu\left(\frac{A_{h}}{A_{l}}\right)^{(\sigma-1) / \sigma}\left[\frac{N_{h}\left(1-u_{h}\right)}{N_{l}\left(1-u_{l}\right)}\right]^{-1 / \sigma} \Phi_{h}\left(\theta_{h}\right)
$$

- $\theta_{h}$ and $u_{h}$ are independent of technological bias.
- It can be derived that $\nu_{l}=\nu_{l}\left(\mu_{l}\right)$.
- Rise of $\boldsymbol{x}=A_{h} / A_{\eta}$ with $\sigma>1$ shifts $L D$ curve downwards in Figure 10.11.
- $u_{l} \uparrow$ and $\frac{u_{l}}{u_{h}} \uparrow$.


Figure 10.11
The unskilled labor market equilibrium.

