

Political Economics II – Spring 2020

Objectives of Course

This course gives a selective introduction to modern political economics and intends to equip the students with a set of common research tools. Specifically, the course introduces basic theoretical models, empirical methodologies, and substantive findings in political economics. It covers not only theoretical and empirical research, but also – and importantly – links between the two.

This basic course is followed in Quarter 4 by Political Economics III, a course which presents selected topics at the current research frontier.

Teachers

The lectures are given by Torsten Persson and David Strömberg and the classes around the problem sets are given by Divya Dev and Xueping Sun.

Schedule and Examination

The course has eight three-hour lectures. It also includes a number of theoretical and empirical exercises that will be discussed in separate sessions. Examination is based on a written exam.

Reading List

Background

- *Chapters 1 and 2 in Persson, T. and G. Tabellini [2000], *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, MIT Press (called P-T 2000 in the following).
- Merlo, A. [2006], “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues,” in Blundell, R., W. Newey and T. Persson (eds.) *Advances in Economics and Econometrics Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Vol I*, Cambridge University Press, available at <http://www.eswc2005.com/>

Part I, Lectures 1-3, Electoral Competition and Voter Behavior

Basic workhorse models

- *Chapter 3 and 7 in P-T 2000.
- Baron, D. [1994], “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters”, *American Political Science Review* 88, 33-47

- Ledyard, J. [1984], "The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections," *Public Choice* 44, 4-71.
- Lindbeck, A. and J. Weibull [1987], "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition", *Public Choice* 52, 195-209.

Empirics

- Ashenfelter, O., C. Harmon, and H. Oosterbeek [1999], "A Review of Estimates of the Schooling/earnings Relationship, with Tests for Publication Bias," *Labour Economics* 6, 453-470.
- Ashenfelter, O. and S. Kelley [1975], "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections", *Journal of Law and Economics* 18, 695-733.
- * Bagues, M., and B. Esteve-Volart [2016], "Politicians' Luck of the Draw: Evidence from the Spanish Christmas Lottery." *Journal of Political Economy* 124, 1269-1294.
- * Dahlberg, M. and E. Johansson [2002], "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments", *American Political Science Review* 96, 27-40.
- De La, O., and L. Ana [2013], "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, 1-14.
- Delli Carpini, M. and S. Keeter [1996], *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*, Yale University Press.
- Finan, F., and L. Schechter [2012], "Vote-buying and Reciprocity," *Econometrica* 80, 863-881.
- *Fujiwara, T. [2015], "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil," *Econometrica* 83, 423-464.
- Gerber, A., and N. Malhotra [2008], "Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect what is Published? Publication Bias in two Leading Political Science Journals." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, 313-326.
- *Husted, T. and L. Kenny [1997], "The Effects of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government", *Journal of Political Economy* 105, 54-81. JSTOR
- Imai, K. et al. [2016], "Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from two Large Scale Randomized Experiments." *American Journal of Political Science* 351, 303-341.
- Labonne, J. [2013], "The Local Electoral Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *Journal of Development Economics* 104: 73-88.
- *Levitt S. and J. Snyder [1997], "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes", *Journal of Political Economy* 105, 30-53
- Lindert, P. H. [1994], "The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930," *Explorations in Economic History* 31, 1-37.
- Lindert, P. H. [1996], "What Limits Social Spending?" *Explorations in Economic History* 33, 1-34.
- *Lott, J and L. Kenny [1999], "How Dramatically Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government", *Journal of Political Economy* 107, 1163-1198.
- *Johansson, E. [2003], "Intergovernmental Grants as a Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities", *Journal of Public Economics* 87, 2003, 883-915.

- *Manacorda, M., E. Miguel, and A. Vigorito [2011], "Government Transfers and Political Support," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3, 1-28.
- Markus, G. [1988], "The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-section Analysis", *American Journal of Political Science* 32, 137-154.
- *Miller, G. [2008], "Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, 1287-1327.
- Pop-Eleches, C. and G. Pop-Eleches [2012], "Targeted Government Spending and Political Preferences," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7, 285-320.
- Rodriguez, R. [1999], "Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States", *Economics and Politics*, 11, 171-199.
- Stokes, S. C. [2005], "Perverse Accountability: A Formal model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," *American Political Science Review* 99, 315-325.
- *Strömberg, D. [2004], "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, 189-221.
- Wolfinger, R. and S. Rosenstone [1980], *Who Votes?*, Yale University Press.

Part II, Lectures 4-6, Partisan Politics and Political Agency

Basic partisan and legislative-bargaining models

- *Chapter 5 and 7 in P-T 2000.
- Alesina, A. [1988], "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 102, 651-678.
- Alesina, A. and R. Holden [2008], "Extremism and Ambiguities in Two-Candidate Elections", NBER Working Paper 14143.
- *Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn [1989], "Bargaining in Legislatures", *American Political Science Review* 83, 1186-1206.
- *Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal [1979], "Bureaucrats vs. Voters: on the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 93, 563-587.

Partisan influence on policy

- *Pettersson-Lidbom, P. [2008], "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes: A Regression Discontinuity Approach", *Journal of European Economic Association* 6, 1037-1056.
- Levitt, S., and J. Snyder [1995], "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays", *American Journal of Political Science* 39, 958-80.
- Levitt, S. [1996], "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology", *American Economic Review* 86, 425-441.
- Rose, R. [1984], "Chapter 4: Testing the Manifesto" in *Do Parties Make a Difference?*, MacMillan Press, London.
- Budge, I. and R. Hofferbert [1990], "Mandates and Policy Outputs: US Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures", *American Political Science Review* 84, 111-131.

Citizen candidates

- *Besley, T. and S. Coate [1997], “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, 85-114.
- Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo [2004], “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in India,” *Econometrica* 72, 1409-1443
- Pande, R. [2003], “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India”, *American Economic Review* 93, 1132-1151.

Agenda setters

- Romer, T., H. Rosenthal, and V.G. Munley [1992], “Economic Incentives and Political Institutions: Spending and Voting in School Budget Referenda”, *Journal of Public Economics* 49, 1-33.

Legislative bargaining

- Arnold, D. [1979], *Congress and the Bureacracy*, Yale University Press.
- *Knight, B. [2008], “Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate,” *Economic Journal* 118, 1785-1803.
- *Knight, B. [2004], “Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation,” NBER Working Paper 10530 (shorter version “Estimating the Value of Proposal Power”, *American Economic Review* 95, 1639–1652).
- Roberts, B. [1990], “A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits”, *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 31-58.
- Stratmann, T. [1992], “The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting”, *American Economic Review* 82, 1162-1176.

Basic agency models

- *Chapter 4 in P-T 2000.
- Barro, R. [1973], “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model”, *Public Choice* 14, 19-42.
- *Besley, T. [2006], “Political Agency and Accountability”, Chapter 3 in *Principled Agents? Lectures on the Political Economy of Good Government*, Oxford University.
- *Ferejohn, J. [1986], “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control”, *Public Choice* 50, 5-26.

Evidence on agency

- Peters, J. and S. Welch [1980], “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections”, *American Political Science Review* 74, 697-708.
- Welch, S. and J. Hibbing [1997], “The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections”, *Journal of Politics*, 226-39.
- *Finan, F. and C. Ferraz [2005], “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, 703-745.
- *Besley T. and A. Case [1995], “Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, 769-798.

- Bender, J. and J. Lott [1996], “Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature”, *Public Choice* 87, 67-100.
- Schmidt, K. and R. Morton [1996], “Evidence on Electoral Accountability in the US Senate: Are Unfaithful Agents Really Punished?”, *Economic Inquiry* 34, 545-567.

Part III, Lectures 7-8, Political Selection

Selection of politicians

- Besley, T. [2005], “Political Selection”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, 43-60.
- Besley, T. and M. Reynal-Querol [2011], “Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?” *American Political Science Review* 105, 552-556.
- Caselli, F. and M. Morelli [2004], “Bad Politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics* 88, 759-782.
- Dal Bo, E. and F. Finan [2018], “Progress and Perspectives in the Study of Political Selection”, *Annual Review of Economics* 10, 541-575.
- *Dal Bo, E., F. Finan, O. Folke, T. Persson, and J. Rickne [2017], “Who Becomes a Politician?”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132, 1877-1914.
- *Dal Bo, E., F. Finan, O. Folke, T. Persson, and J. Rickne [2019], “Economic Losers and Political Winners: Evidence from Sweden’s Radical Right”, Mimeo.
- Francois, P. [2000], “‘Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument for Government Provision”, *Journal of Public Economics* 78, 275-299.
- Galasso, V. and T. Nannicini [2011], “Competing on Good Politicians”, *American Political Science Review* 105, 79-99.
- Hall, A., D. Thompson, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Yoder [2019], “Who Becomes a Member of Congress? Evidence from De-Anonymized Census Data,” NBER Working Paper, No. 26156.
- Messner, M. and M. K. Polborn [2004], “Paying Politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics* 88, 2423-2445.
- Rydgren, J. [2018], (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Selection of party leaders

- Anagol, S. and T. Fujiwara [2014], “The Runner-Up Effect”, *Journal of Political Economy* 124, 927-991.
- Ansolabehere, S., S. Hirano, and J. Snyder [2007], “What Did the Direct Primaries Do to Party Loyalty in Congress, Party and Policy Making?”, in *Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress*, D. Brady and M. McCubbins (eds.), Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Carey, J., and J. Polga-Hecimovich [2006], “Primary Elections and Candidate Strength in Latin America”, *Journal of Politics* 68, 530–43.
- Crisp, B., S. Olivella, M. Malecki, and M. Sher [2013], “Vote-Earning Strategies in Flexible List Systems: Seats at the Price of Unity”, *Electoral Studies* 32, 658–69.
- *Folke, O., T. Persson, and J. Rickne [2016], “The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions”, *American Political Science Review* 110, 559-578.

- Hirano, S. and J. Snyder [2014], “Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected Officials”, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9, 473-500.
- Hortala-Vallve, R., and H. Mueller [2015], “Primaries the Unifying Force”, *Public Choice* 163, 289-305.
- Piketty, T. [2009], “Voting as Communicating”, *Review of Economic Studies* 67, 169–91.
- Razin, R. [2003], “Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates”, *Econometrica* 71, 1083–1119.

Gender quotas and selection of ability

- Baltrunaite, A., P. Bello, A. Casarico, and P. Profeta [2014], “Gender Quotas and the Quality of Politicians”, *Journal of Public Economics* 118, 62-74.
- *Besley, T, O. Folke, T. Persson, and J. Rickne [2017], “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden”, *American Economic Review* 107, 2204-2242.
- Casas-Arce, P. and A. Saiz [2015], “Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back?” *Journal of Political Economy* 123, 641-669.
- Egorov, G. and K. Sonin [2011], “Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off”, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9, 903-930.
- Gagliarducci, S. and D. Paserman [2012], “Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena”, *Review of Economic Studies* 79, 1021-1052.
- O’Brien, D. and J. Rickne [2016], “Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Leadership”, *American Political Science Review* 110, 112-126.

Dynastic rents of selected politicians

- Akcigit, U., S. Baslandze, and F. Lotti [2018], “Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics”, NBER Working Paper 25136.
- Amore, M., M. Bennesen, and K. M. Nielsen [2015], “Return to Political Power in a Low Corruption Environment”, Mimeo, INSEAD.
- Dal Bo, E., P. Dal Bo, and J. Snyder [2009], “Political Dynasties”, *Review of Economic Studies* 76, 115-142.
- Fafchamps, M. and J. Labonne [2017], “Do Politicians' Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections”, *Journal of Law Economics and Organization* 33, 268-300.
- Fisman, R. [2001], “Estimating the Value of Political Connections”, *American Economic Review* 91, 1095-1102.
- Fisman, R., F. Schulz, and V. Vig [2014], “The Private Returns to Public Office”, *Journal of Political Economy* 122, 806-862.
- *Folke, O., T. Persson, and J. Rickne [2017], “Dynastic Political Rents”, *Economic Journal* 127, F495-517.
- Folke, O. and J. Rickne [2016], “The Price of Promotion: Gender Differences in the Impact of Career Success on Divorce”, Mimeo, Uppsala University.
- Gagliarducci, S. and M. Manacorda [2015], “Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms”, Mimeo, Queen Mary University.

- George, S. [2018], “Like Father Like Son: The Effects of Political Dynasties on Economic Development”, Mimeo, Harvard University.
- Geys, B. [2017], “Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians? Human Capital”, *Economic Journal* 127, F474-494.