Organizational Dynamics: 
Culture, Design, and Performance*

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May 2018

Abstract

This paper examines the two-way interaction between organizational culture and a key aspect of organizational design, namely the choice between centralization and decentralization. We model culture via the share of managers in an organization that adopt one of two types, which affects the way they choose projects and internalize the payoffs of other managers. Using a class of "Darwinian" cultural dynamics based on the relative payoffs of each type, we investigate the conditions under which different cultures become dominant. Our generic model delivers insights into the interplay between organizational design and culture, the coexistence of different organizational cultures, the emergence of dysfunctional cultures, and organizational resistance to change. We apply special cases of this generic framework to the behavior of bureaucracies, firms, and political parties.

*We are grateful to Philippe Aghion, Roland Benabou, Maitreesh Ghatak, Bob Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Jay Lee, Rocco Macchiavello, Andrea Prat, Jean Tirole, Eric Verhoogen as well as participants in meetings with the IOG program of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the ERINN network, the Growth and Institutions program at Tsinghua University, the 2017 PEG Conference, the 2017 ESS conference, the 2018 conference on Culture, Institutions and Prosperity, the 2018 NBER Organizational Economics Working Group meeting, and an IIES seminar for helpful discussions and comments. Financial support from the European Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction

One of the key issues in economics is to understand why organizations that operate in similar environments often perform very differently. A large literature on the strategic design of organizations now studies what determines their boundaries and authority structures and how these may shape performance, with classic contributions including Coase (1937), Williamson (1979), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Aghion and Tirole (1997). Outside of economics, another approach attributes performance principally to different organizational cultures (Whyte 1956, Hofstede 1984, Wilson 1989, and Schein 1990). Our paper puts forward a dynamic model of organizational culture, design and performance which builds a bridge between these two traditions.

We begin by developing a canonical model where the classical design choice of how much to centralize or decentralize decision-making interacts with a time-varying organizational culture. We then study four specific applications of this model to bureaucracies, firms, and political parties. The choice between centralization and decentralization follows Aghion and Tirole (1997) or Alonso et al (2008) where the leader’s design decision involves a trade off between benefits from local information and costs due to conflicts of interests or foregone coordination. In our approach, this decision depends on the prevailing culture in the organization.

Despite widespread sympathy for its importance among some economists, there is little consensus on how to model organizational culture. One common economic approach has been to model culture as an equilibrium set of common beliefs about how others in the organization will behave (or about how the world works), following Kreps (1990) or Greif (1994). Here, we follow a different approach based on three building blocks. First, culture reflects the distribution of types in the organization as in Lazear (1995). Second, employees identify with a type and internalize its values, as in Ashfort and Mael (1989) or Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Third, types are transmitted across generations of employees via a socialization process based on the relative “fitness” of each type in the organization as in the cultural evolution models of Boyd and Richerson (1985).

The framework has two distinctive features. For a given distribution of identity types – representing a given culture – the organization’s leader decentralizes project choices if the culture is congruent with the leader’s objective. This in turn influences the cultural dynamics by affecting whether each type does well or poorly in the organization. Thus organizational de-
sign and culture coevolve interdependently and this shapes the organization’s performance.

The model generates insights into a range of phenomena. First, it highlights the joint determination of organizational culture and design. Second, it shows that multiple steady-state cultures may exist for the same fundamentals, such as technology and market conditions. Thus, the performance of organizations operating in similar environments can diverge, as their cultures become entrenched. This provides a foundation for an organization’s observed “capability”. Third, and related, stable dysfunctional cultures can emerge — i.e., the organization’s performance is entrenched by having the wrong mix of types. Fourth, organizational culture becomes a natural source of inertia, such that organizations may not respond to shocks in their environment.

To breathe life into the canonical model, we apply it in four contexts. The first application is to public bureaucracies and stresses dilemmas of top-down control as a response to differential performance by organizational units. The second is to private firms and the focus is on how observed correlations between productivity, culture, and organizational design (management style) can arise endogenously over time. Here we ask when market competition weeds out dysfunctional cultures. A third application illustrates how a strong organizational culture may become a barrier to innovation when a firm tries to adapt to new market conditions. The fourth application is to political organization and shows how a political parties competing with an other party can gain an advantage (or disadvantage) through its evolved culture, which affects the interplay between party design and effort by party workers.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses some related research, and Section 3 points to IBM’s difficulties in the 1980s as a motivating example. Section 4 develops our canonical model of cultural dynamics and organization design, while Section 5 analyzes its static and dynamic equilibria. Section 6 applies this model to bureaucracies, firms, and political parties. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in an Appendix.

2 Related Literature

Our paper is related to the voluminous literature on organizational cultures (see e.g., Schein 1990), which is influenced more by sociology, psychology, and
anthropology than by economics. Leading authors in this area such Wolcott and Lippitz (2007) suggest that

“Unless a company is blessed with the right culture – and few are – corporate entrepreneurship won’t just happen. It needs to be nurtured and managed as a strategic, deliberate act.” (page 82).

Researchers in this tradition have debated at length how organizational cultures are created, and many stress the role of charismatic founders (Schein 1983). This has been linked to the perils of reforming established organizations – especially from the top down – and the emerging conflicts once cultures become established (see, e.g., Gelfand et al 2015). We build a bridge from these ideas to a more economic perspective.

As mentioned in the introduction, the most common approach among economists who study corporate cultures focuses on beliefs. Kreps (1990) models culture as a belief-based norm in a game played by overlapping generations of agents, where cooperation is sustained by a threat of poor future performance. Tirole (1996) also adopts a generational structure to study the interplay between individual and collective reputations, which can produce persistent differences in organizational performance indicators such as levels of corruption. Similarly, Dessi (2008) emphasizes how information transmission by older generations may create distinct cultures through collective memory, while Benabou (2013) argues that organizations may develop common sets of beliefs that induce “group think.” Foundations of cultural differences based on beliefs have also been explored in other contexts. Greif (1994) sees them as solutions to (different) commitment problems, and he describes “collectivist” cultures as those with beliefs more supportive of cooperation.

In contrast to belief-based approaches, we model behavior in the organization governed by underlying values. This follows influential treatments of culture outside of economics. For example, in their book on culture and organizations, Hofstede et al (2010) use the term “software of the mind” to describe the role of culture and regard underlying values as the deepest embodiment of culture.

Specifically, we build on a strand of the organizations literature which argues that organizations may evolve distinctive cultures through the types of people they employ. How shared motives of employees might affect their decisions has thus been explored by Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Prendergast (2007). Hodgson (1996) and Lazear (1995) propose models that are
similar to ours in stressing how different types evolve over time within an organization.

Our modeling approach is based on types holding different social identities that manifest themselves in behavior and in values over organizational outcomes. This approach is motivated by the work of Ashforth and Mael (1989) in sociology and organizational behavior, and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) in economics. A crucial assumption is that an individual identifies more with her own peer group than the organization at large. We model this as internalizing values whereby individuals perceive a stronger affinity with group members and therefore more likely conform with group norms. Ashforth and Mael (1989) stress, in particular, how emerging group loyalties interact with identities. Akerlof (1976) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) stress how social identities can be represented in preferences acting on individual behavior.

Our approach supposes that culture is transmitted across different generations of the organization’s employees via socialization. This is represented by a dynamic process where successful types increase their share over time relative to less successful types. Those “Darwinian dynamics” build on models of cultural evolution, inspired by the seminal work by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). Studies of socialization and cultural economics has grown in recent years; Bisin and Verdier (2011) survey this field. Our specific model of organizational dynamics through changes in values – rather than dynamics of behavior or beliefs – follows the lead of Güth and Yaari (1992), Güth (1995), and Alger and Weibull (2013). There is also a close link between the formal structure of our specific model and the general literature on evolutionary dynamics in population games, as reviewed in Sandholm (2010).

Leading textbooks in the field of organizational behavior such as Robbins and Judge (2016) discuss the central role of management in changing organizational dynamics. They emphasize how stress created by periods of change can decrease performance along a transition path, a feature of the approach taken here particularly when change is implemented by centralized decisions that disempower some tiers of management. In a broader sense, our approach relates to the voluminous literature on evolving firm capabilities beginning with Dierickx and Cool (1989) – in our world, firms with functional cultures enjoy higher productivity by eliciting greater effort from employees.

Teece et al (1997) argue that the ability to adapt is a core dynamic capability of the firm, while Rantakari (2008) studies this ability and its relation to centralization/decentralization from an economics perspective. Our model
captures this dynamic element through a process of cultural change.

Gibbons and Henderson (2012) survey the emerging literature on management and its importance in shaping firm-level productivity. Dessein and Prat (2017) use evidence on the importance of management to motivate a new source of organizational change in the form of slow-moving organizational capital, which shapes performance.

Measurement of cultural differences has flourished, but largely outside of economics. For example, Hofstede (1984) began a body of research comparing organizational cultures across countries, assuming that cross-country cultural differences rub off on organizations active in those countries.\footnote{See Hofstede et al (2010) for a more recent survey of the extensive evidence that has been collected.} The well-known World Values Survey was developed as a means of examining international cultural differences (see Inglehart et al 2004). Empirical studies of culture have also become extensive in economics (see Alesina et al 2015, and Guiso et al 2006 for overviews). While these have mostly studied individuals, they have also been applied to firms. For example, Guiso et al (2015) argue that corporate cultures which encompass integrity are likely to improve performance.

A large literature in business economics and sociology studies conflicts of interest inside firms, with many authors taking a starting point in Cyert and March (1963). Economists have asked how conflicting interests shape the delegation of decision-making, with key contributions by Aghion and Tirole (1997), Alonso et al (2008), Bolton and Farrell (1990), Hart and Holmström (2010), and Rantakari (2012). This approach often highlights how a designer weighs the informational benefits of delegation against the value of coordination. In the same tradition, Bloom et al (2012) study empirically the decentralization in firms, and find productivity gains from decentralization associated with greater levels of trust. Bandiera et al (2016) examine how CEOs use their scarce time, especially when it comes to their involvement in production vs. coordination. In our setting, conflicts of interest and delegation arise endogenously over time and across states of the world, via the interaction between an organization’s external environment and its internal cultural evolution.
3  IBM’s Design and Culture

To frame the ideas to follow, we consider the case of IBM, the subject of many studies of organizational culture including the classic work by Hofstede (1984). These studies argue that the organizational dynamics and culture of IBM reflect the ethos and charisma of the company’s CEO Thomas J. Watson. Leading textbooks on the origins of corporate success, such as Peters and Waterman (1982), also feature IBM as a prominent example, arguing that

“(w)hat makes it live at these companies is a plethora of structural devices, systems, styles, and values, all reinforcing one another so that the companies are truly unusual in their ability to achieve extraordinary results through ordinary people...”

This quote highlights the importance of values and the need to encourage and motivate employees to serve the organization.

In the 1950s, IBM was a behemoth of mainframe computing with a dominant market share. By 1980, the company retained a 62% share of the mainframe-computer market. But its share of the overall computer market had declined from 60% in 1970 to 32% – partly by underperforming in the fast-growing mini-computer market during the 1970s relative to its rivals. In 1979, this led Business Week to describe IBM as a “stodgy, mature company”, a view corroborated by the 20% decline in IBM’s stock price. To espouse the new personal-computer industry, the firm began developing the now-famed IBM PC, which prompted the quip that “IBM bringing out a personal computer would be like teaching an elephant to tap dance.”

In the end, the transformation was made, but much was written about the difficulties when shifting focus from mainframes to networks and personal computing. Mills (1996) discussed this based on interviews with IBM management, emphasizing the balance between centralized and decentralized decision making.

“IBM’s top executives attempted to manage the corporation from the top, despite its great size and complexity, and in so doing exceeded their capabilities. But IBM is a closely integrated company, operates in only one industry, and has much synergy between its various businesses. It requires a high degree of central
coordination and direction. It needs a judicious blend of decentralized operating management and centralized strategic direction. In the 1980s, IBM’s executives failed to get the mixture right.” (page 81).

Mills also blamed IBM’s culture for the firm’s limited response:

“Is IBM the victim of a corporate culture that pushed the wrong type of executive to the top? Yes. IBM chief executives were too inbred, too steeped in the arrogance of success, and too certain of their own judgment in a time of challenge. IBM’s culture contributed greatly to each shortcoming.” (page 81)

The IBM case shares three key features with our model. First, organizational culture engenders a sense of belonging and a common interest among groups of employees. Second, once entrenched, a culture can limit an organization’s adaptability in the wake of changing priorities and market conditions. Third, a clash between top leaders and a prevailing management culture highlights the centralization question. In the model that follows, we refer back to example of IBM and our application of the model to firm innovation in Section 6.3 also deals with IBM.

4 Basic Framework

This section describes the assumptions about actors, conditions, objectives, and timing in our general model, while the next section states our main results and discusses their implications.

Key actors Consider an organization with a three-tier hierarchy: a leader, a set of senior managers, and a set of junior managers. The leader faithfully represents the organization’s ultimate principal(s) – the owners of a firm, ministry (or customers) of a bureaucracy, or voters of a party – and shares their preferences. She picks a centralized or decentralized organizational design $o \in \{c, d\}$, where decentralization, $o = d$, may have benefits (better information) as well as costs (lack of coordination or conflicting interests). She also makes project choices (see below) if the organization is centralized, $o = c$. 

8
The organization has a continuum of divisions indexed $\omega \in [0,1]$. Each division has an upper-tier (senior) manager who chooses projects if the organization is decentralized, $o = d$. The manager in division $\omega$ can be one of two types denoted $\tau(\omega) \in \{0,1\}$, and the share of type 0 in the organization as a whole is $\mu$.

Each division also has a lower-tier (junior) manager who invests in effort $e(\omega, \theta)$. This period’s junior managers also become next period’s senior managers and, before doing so, acquire their type from interacting with senior managers. Although this would be an interesting extension, we abstract from the possibility of external recruitment of senior managers by supposing that all upper-tier managers must be internally recruited.

**States of the world and project choices** The payoff from different project choices depends in part on an aggregate state $\theta \in \{0,1\}$ which captures the organization’s prevailing environment. In the IBM example, the state $\theta \in \{0,1\}$ could capture market conditions favoring mainframes or PCs, respectively. This state is realized period by period and is iid over time with $\beta$ denoting the probability that $\theta = 0$. We will refer to the environment being predictable when $\beta$ is close to either 0 or 1, and as being unpredictable when $\beta$ is closer to $\frac{1}{2}$. As we shall see this plays a role in the possible steady states that can arise.

Each division $\omega$ has to make a project choice, $\rho(\omega, \theta) \in \{0,1\}$. With centralization ($o(\theta) = c$), the leader chooses a common project for all divisions, i.e., $\rho(\theta, \omega) \in \{0,1\}$ for all $\omega$. With decentralization ($o(\theta) = d$), the upper upper-tier manager in $\omega$ chooses $\rho(\omega, \theta) \in \{0,1\}$. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997), we abstract away from contracting – state-contingent or not – to influence decentralized project choices. We think of this being due to non-verifiability of project choices.

The payoffs to projects depends on the realized aggregate state $\theta$ and the alignment of local projects with a local state $\sigma(\omega, \theta) \in \{0,1\}$. For $\theta \in \{0,1\}$, a share $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{2}$ of all divisions has $\sigma(\omega, \theta) = \theta$. Hence, $\alpha$ measures how tightly the technology, demand, or cost is correlated across divisions.

**Leader — organizational payoff** A leader observes the aggregate state $\theta$ and the composition of division managers as captured by $\mu$. But she does not observe the state, $\sigma(\omega, \theta)$, in each division. Nor does she observe the type of manager, $\tau(\omega)$, heading each division.
When making her decision about much power to decentralize, \( \alpha(\theta) \), the leader maximizes an objective function which is increasing in each of three components denoted by:

\[
\Pi(\lambda (2x - 1)^2, \int \pi(|\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta) d\omega, e).
\]

The first term \((2x - 1)^2\) reflects coordination, as \(x\) is the (maximum) share of divisions that takes the same action \(\rho\), a term which is maximized (at 1) when every \(\omega\) makes the same choice. Parameter \(\lambda\) indexes the importance of coordination gains. This way of capturing coordination benefits is similar to that in research on the scope of the firm (Hart and Holmström 2010) and on coordination in firms or other organizations (Bolton and Farrell 1990, Alonso et al. 2008).

The second term summarizes how performance depends on the average, and state-dependent, adaptation of local projects to local conditions. Here, \(\pi(|\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta)\) is the payoff to alignment between the state and project in division \(\omega\). Throughout, we assume that

\[
\pi(0, 0) - \pi(1, 0) = \pi(1, 1) - \pi(0, 1) > 0.
\]

A local state aligned with the local project is thus always optimal in state \(\theta = 0\), and never optimal in state \(\theta = 1\). Referring to the IBM example, in mainframe (PC) state 0 (1) payoffs are the highest if managers choose projects more directed to mainframes (PCs) by setting \(\rho(\omega, \theta) = \sigma(\omega, \theta) = 0\) \((\rho(\omega, \theta) \neq \sigma(\omega, \theta))\).

The third term is defined over aggregate effort in the organization, \(e = \int e(\omega, \theta) d\omega\), adding efforts by lower-tier managers across all divisions \(\omega\).

A special case of the organization’s payoff, used in some of the Section 6 applications, has

\[
\Pi \left( \lambda (2x - 1)^2, \int \pi(|\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta) d\omega, e \right)
\]

\[
= \lambda (2x - 1)^2 \times \int \pi(|\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta) d\omega \times e,
\]

which we refer to as the "multiplicative case". We also sometimes assume

\[
\pi(0, 0) = \pi(1, 1) > \pi(1, 0) - \pi(0, 1) = 0,
\]
which we refer to as the "symmetric case".

We assume that the leader chooses the design \( o(\theta) \) in period \( t \) following the realization of \( \theta \) in order to maximize (1) in that same period. As discussed further in Section 5.3, what is important is not the one-period horizon, but that the leader cannot commit to a policy rule for the future.

Upper-tier managers – types and choices  Each upper-tier manager observes the local state in her division \( \sigma(\omega, \theta) \), as well as \( \theta \). Upper-tier managers thus have an information advantage over the leader, although this advantage is smaller (on average) with a larger \( \alpha \), because the local states are more correlated across divisions. When the organization is decentralized, \( o(\theta) = d \), upper-tier managers choose the projects \( \rho(\omega, \theta) \) locally.

A share \( \mu_t \) of managers identify as type 0 and the complementary share identify as type 1. Shared identity has two parts: a common preference over projects and a concern with welfare of others of the same type. Thus the payoff of a manager of type \( \tau(\omega) \) is given by:

\[
v(\tau(\omega), \omega, \theta) = e(\omega, \theta)u(\rho(\omega, \theta - \sigma(\omega, \theta)), \tau(\omega)) + \int e(\omega, \theta)\xi(\tau(\omega))u(\rho(\omega, \theta - \sigma(\omega, \theta)), \tau(\omega))d\omega,
\]

where \( \tau(\omega) \in \{0, 1\} \) is the type in division \( \omega \neq \omega \) with

\[
\xi(\tau(\omega)) = \begin{cases} 
\xi > 0 & \text{if } \tau(\omega) = \tau(\omega) \\
0 & \text{if } \tau(\omega) \neq \tau(\omega).
\end{cases}
\]

The first term in (5) captures the common preference across projects. We assume that type-0 managers prefer \( \rho(\omega, \theta) = \sigma(\omega, \theta) \), while type-1 managers prefer \( \rho(\omega, \theta) = 1 - \sigma(\omega, \theta) \), i.e.,

\[
u(1, 1) = u(0, 0) = u > u(0, 1) = u(1, 0) = 0.
\]

This builds in a symmetry property: there is no intrinsic payoff benefit to being a type 0 or 1.

The second term represents an organization-wide "esprit de corps" for managers of your own type whose strength is indexed by \( \xi \). The size of this payoff depends in part on the leader’s equilibrium design choices.

Henceforth, we refer to \( \mu_t \) as the organization’s culture. In state \( \theta = 0 \), the leader’s preferences align with those of type \( \tau = 0 \) managers, but clash
with the preferences of type $\tau = 1$ managers, and vice versa in state $\theta = 1$. In the IBM example, mainframe (PC) types do what the leader wants in the mainframe (PC) state. The latent leader-manager conflict thus varies both across states, with $\theta$, and across time periods, with $\mu_t$. This conflict crucially influences the leader’s willingness to decentralize projects to take advantage of local information, as in the (static) model of Aghion and Tirole (1997). Note that the leader cannot resolve such conflict by hiring, as we do not allow outside hiring of upper-level managers. And even if we would allow outside hiring, types are organization-specific. Below, we discuss how relaxing these assumptions might affect the analysis.

**Lower-tier managers – effort** When entering the organization, each lower-tier manager chooses an effort level, $e \in [e_l, e_H]$.\(^2\) As this choice is non-verifiable, no effort-contingent contracts are possible. Effort has a private cost $\psi(e)$, which is increasing and convex with $\psi(e) = 0$. The latter guarantees a minimum effort of $e_l$. The payoff of lower-tier managers is

$$e(\omega, \theta)l(|\rho(\omega, \theta - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \tau(\omega)),$$

which we interpret as a share of the upper-tier manager’s “rent”, with

$$l(1, 1) = l(0, 0) = l > l(0, 1) = l(1, 0) = 0.$$

Lower-tier managers decide on effort after learning state $\theta$, but before knowing which upper-tier manager they are matched with. If $\gamma$ is the probability that $l(|\rho(\omega, \theta - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \tau(\omega)) = l$ – i.e., that a lower-tier manager works for a “motivated” upper-tier manager – we can then write optimal effort as

$$e^*(\gamma) = \arg \max_{e \in [e_l, e_H]} \{\gamma le - \psi(e)\},$$

where $e^*(\gamma)$ is increasing in $\gamma$. Given the assumed timing, all lower-tier managers will choose the same level of effort.

**Lower-tier managers – transmission of types** Cultural transmission of types/social identities from senior upper-tier managers to junior lower-tier managers is a deterministic map from $\mu_t$ to $\mu_{t+1}$. We specify an evolutionary

\(^2\)This effort decision is best thought of as a sunk investment which aids the productivity of the organization.
process, but are agnostic about the specific mechanism behind it. Specifically, we consider the class

\[ \mu_{t+1} = \mu_t + q(\mu_t) (1 - q(\mu_t)) Q(\Delta), \]  

(6)

where, for all \( 0 \leq \mu_t \leq 1 \), function \( Q \) is assumed continuous and increasing with \( Q(0) = 0 \) and increasing function \( q(\mu_t) \in [0, 1] \) with \( q(1) = 1 \) and \( q(0) = 0 \).

Argument \( \Delta \) denotes \textit{relative fitness} – i.e., the \textit{expected} value of holding a type-0 rather than a type-1 identity:

\[ \Delta(\mu) = E[v(0, \omega, \theta) - v(1, \omega, \theta); \mu], \]  

(7)

where the expectation is taken over \( \omega \) and \( \theta \). \( Q \) increasing in \( \Delta \) assumes a “Darwinian” transmission process: if one type does better (in expectation), its share increases over time. However, its share remains constant when relative fitness is zero.

In the Appendix, we show that the functional form in (6) can be derived from a microfounded model where junior managers are socialized by senior managers. But it can also capture a replicator dynamic, where junior managers simply imitate more successful senior types. With the former transmission, relative fitness depends on tomorrow’s culture \( \Delta(\mu_{t+1}) \); with the latter, it depends on today’s culture \( \Delta(\mu_t) \). As we will see in the next section, however, the qualitative properties of the model do not depend on this detail.

**Timing**  The organization evolves over time, with all relevant variables indexed by \( t \). The full timing of the model in period \( t \) is as follows:

1. The organization enters \( t \) with generation upper-tier managers, share \( \mu_t \) of which has type \( \tau = 0 \), and the remainder has \( \tau = 1 \). Nature determines \( \theta \in \{0, 1\} \), and \( \sigma(\omega, \theta) \) for \( \omega \in [0, 1] \). A new generation lower-tier managers enters

2. Lower-tier managers invest in effort \( e_t \in [\underline{e}, \bar{e}] \)

3. Each lower-tier manager is randomly matched with one upper-tier manager. Social identities are transmitted to the former, which gives \( \mu_{t+1} \).

4. The leader chooses organizational form \( o \in \{c, d\} \)
5. If \( o(\theta) = c \), the leader chooses a single value \( \rho(\theta) \in \{0,1\} \), binding for all \( \omega \).

If \( o(\theta) = d \), upper-tier managers in each division choose \( \rho(\omega, \theta) \in \{0,1\} \)

6. Payoffs are realized, upper-tier managers retire, and are replaced by the current lower-tier managers.

5 Analysis

In this section, we first study equilibrium choices in a given period with a fixed organizational culture – a fraction \( \mu \) of type-0 managers. This allows us to map organizational culture into equilibrium organization design (and effort) as summarized in Proposition 1. Next, we study how fraction \( \mu_t \) evolves through a dynamic process, which maps the outcomes under different designs into (changes of) organizational culture as summarized in Proposition 2. Finally, we draw four lessons from these two propositions.

5.1 Organization Design

How \( e(\omega, \theta) \) and \( \rho(\omega, \theta) \) are determined depends on whether the organization is centralized or not.

Centralized control – stage 5 In a centralized organization, the leader chooses \( \rho(\omega, \theta) \) at stage 5. These decisions follow (the proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions are in the Appendix).

Lemma 1 With centralization the leader picks \( \rho(\omega, \theta) = 0 \) for \( \theta \in \{0,1\} \).

Given the payoff structure, the leader wishes to set \( \rho(\omega, 0) = 0 \) and \( \rho(\omega, 1) \neq 1 \). Thus a centralized organization always picks the same project for all divisions whatever the \( \theta \) state. However, the interpretation of choosing project \( \rho(\omega, \theta) = 0 \) can be quite different in the two states. This means that \( x = 1 \), and there are no losses from lack of coordination.

Given the timing, \( e^* \) is independent of \( \omega \) and hence we write \( e(\omega, \theta) = e^*(\gamma(\theta)) \) where

\[
\gamma(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
\mu \alpha + (1-\mu)(1-\alpha) & \text{if } \theta = 0 \\
1 - \mu \alpha - (1-\mu)(1-\alpha) & \text{if } \theta = 1
\end{cases}
\] (8)
is the probability that the senior manager for whom the junior manager works has his preferred project choice when the aggregate state is $\theta$. This determines the probability that a junior manager shares in the senior manager’s decision rents.

The leader’s (and organization’s) payoff is therefore

$$
\begin{align*}
\Pi (\lambda, [\alpha \pi (0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (1, 0)], e^* (\gamma (0))) & \quad \text{if } \theta = 0 \\
\Pi (\lambda, [\alpha \pi (1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (0, 1)], e^* (1 - \gamma (0))) & \quad \text{if } \theta = 1,
\end{align*}
$$

where we use the fact that $\gamma (1) = 1 - \gamma (0)$.

**Decentralized control – stage 5** With decentralization, the $\mu$ divisions with type-0 upper-tier managers set $\rho (\omega, \theta) = \sigma (\omega, \theta)$. And the $(1 - \mu)$ divisions with type-1 managers set $\rho (\omega, \theta) = 1 - \sigma (\omega, \theta)$. Here, we have

$$
x = \max \{\mu (1 - \alpha) + (1 - \mu) \alpha, \mu \alpha + (1 - \mu) (1 - \alpha)\} \in [0, 1].
$$

However, effort is now at its maximum, as all lower-tier managers anticipate sharing in the decision rents of the upper-tier managers. So with centralization, $\gamma (\theta) = 1$ for $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$ and effort is $e^* (1)$.

The leader’s payoff (and organization’s) with decentralization is therefore

$$
\Pi (\lambda (2x - 1)^2, [\mu \pi (0, \theta) + (1 - \mu) \pi (1, \theta)], e^* (1)).
$$

Compared to centralization, the leader (and organization) always weakly loses from coordination since $x \leq 1$. She may gain or lose from the extent of project alignment, depending on $\theta$, $\alpha$ and $\mu$. Effort is higher with centralization although by exactly how much depends on $\mu$ and $\alpha$.

**Centralization versus decentralization – stage 4** The leader will chose whether or not to centralize decision making over projects depending on the values of $\mu$ and $\alpha$ and conditional on the realized value of $\theta$. The optimal decisions are described in:

**Proposition 1** There exists $\{\mu_L, \mu_H\}$ with $\mu_H > \mu_L$ such that:

1. $o (0) = d$ if and only if
   $$
   \mu \geq \mu_H \geq \alpha
   $$
2. \( o(1) = d \) if and only if

\[ \mu \leq \mu_L \leq 1 - \alpha. \]

Proposition 1 makes intuitive sense. Suppose the interests of leaders and type-0 managers are aligned, as when \( \theta = 0 \). A leader will decentralize if such managers make up a sufficiently large fraction of all upper-tier managers. Conversely, the leader will only decentralize when \( \theta = 1 \) provided that sufficiently many managers are of type 1. In the IBM-example, the leader decentralizes in the mainframe (PC) state provided the share of mainframe-type managers is high (low) enough. Note that when \( \lambda = 0 \), and coordination is unimportant, \( \mu_H = \alpha = 1 - \mu_L \).

5.2 Cultural Evolution

Having solved for the static equilibrium, we now turn to the dynamics of the organization’s culture – its share of type-0 managers.

Candidate steady states The transmission rule in (6) yields three possible steady states, at corners \( \mu = 0 \) and \( \mu = 1 \) and an interior point where \( \Delta(\mu) = 0 \). We say that a steady state is stable if a small shock to \( \mu \) leads to organization converging back to the steady state and unstable otherwise.

The following result is applied below

Lemma 2 Suppose there exists \( \tilde{\mu} \in [0, 1] \), such that \( \Delta(\tilde{\mu}) = 0 \). If \( \Delta(\mu) \) is globally increasing, there are two stable steady states at \( \mu = 0 \) and \( \mu = 1 \), and the interior steady state at \( \tilde{\mu} \) is unstable.

In the remainder of this subsection, we present a sufficient condition for relative fitness \( \Delta(\mu) \) to be globally increasing along the equilibrium path, and show that it implies divergent dynamics such that the organization eventually ends up in one of the extremal states.

Equilibrium relative fitness – different cases Given the earlier expressions for (5) and (7), we can compute equilibrium relative fitness (of adopting type 0 rather than 1) for any realization of \( \mu \). To do so, we take expectations over \( \omega \) and different realizations of \( \theta \), given \( \mu \). Note from (8) that \( \gamma(\theta) \) is
a function of $\mu$ when there is centralization. Taking the equilibrium design choices from Proposition 1, there are three regimes to consider.

In the first regime, $\theta = 0$ and $\mu \leq \mu_H$, so the leader optimally centralizes and sets $\rho = 0$. Then, relative fitness becomes

$$\delta_H (\mu) = u e^* (\gamma (0)) [2\alpha - 1 + \xi (\mu + \alpha - 1)].$$

Note that this expression is increasing in $\mu$ for two reasons. On the one hand, the type-0 group grows such that a manager internalizes payoffs for a larger group. On the other hand, equilibrium effort goes up – recall that $\gamma (0)$ is increasing in $\mu$ – as managers have a larger chance of working with their preferred projects.

In the second regime, $\theta = 1$ and $\mu \geq \mu_L$ the leader centralizes, again setting $\rho = 0$. Relative fitness becomes

$$\delta_L (\mu) = u e^* (1 - \gamma (0))[1 - 2\alpha + (\mu - \alpha)\xi].$$

This expression has an ambiguous slope in $\mu$, as effort is now going down, which may outweigh the positive group-size effect.

In the third regime of the complementary cases, there is decentralization and relative fitness is

$$\hat{\delta} (\mu) = [\xi [2\mu - 1] u] e^*(1).$$

In this case too, relative fitness is increasing in $\mu$ due to the positive group-size effect.

**When is relative fitness increasing?** We now write the expected relative fitness of being a type-0 manager vs. a type-1 manager as:

$$\Delta (\mu) = \begin{cases} 
\beta \delta (\mu) + (1 - \beta) \delta_L (\mu) & \text{if } \mu > \mu_H \\
\beta \delta_H (\mu) + (1 - \beta) \delta_L (\mu) & \text{if } \mu \in [\mu_L, \mu_H] \\
\beta \delta_H (\mu) + (1 - \beta) \hat{\delta} (\mu) & \text{if } \mu < \mu_L,
\end{cases}$$

(9)

where the dependence on $\beta$ is due to stochastic realizations of $\theta$. Note that $\Delta (\mu)$ incorporates the equilibrium rule for state-contingent design choices (through its constituent $\delta$ functions), but not the actual design choice in period $t$. As $\mu$ varies between 0 and 1, $\Delta (\mu)$ changes both smoothly, away
from the cutoff values $\mu_L$ and $\mu_H$, while it jumps discretely at these cutoff values.\footnote{It is possible that $\Delta(\mu)$ will be decreasing due to downward jumps at these cutoff values and if $\delta_L(\mu)$ is decreasing.}

We now assume:

**Assumption 1** $e^*(\mu + \alpha - 2\mu\alpha) - (1 - 2\alpha)(\mu - \alpha) \frac{\partial e^*(\mu + \alpha - 2\mu\alpha)}{\partial \mu} > 0$ for $\mu \geq \alpha$.

This assumption holds if effort is not too responsive over the relevant range. Then, we obtain

**Lemma 3** If Assumption 1 holds, then for all $\{\mu, \beta\} \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$, there exists $\xi$ such that $\Delta(\mu)$ is globally increasing in $\mu$ for all values of $\xi \geq \xi$.

Lemma 3 implies that $\hat{\delta}(\mu_H) \geq \delta_H(\mu_H)$ and $\hat{\delta}(\mu_L) \leq \delta_L(\mu_L)$, so that $\Delta(\mu)$ takes an upward (downward) jump as we cross the two thresholds, $\mu_H$ and $\mu_L$, from below (above). Moreover, $\Delta_{\mu}(\mu) > 0$ for all intermediate values $\mu$, away from these thresholds. Hence, $\Delta(\mu)$ is globally increasing.

Lemma 3 says that if cultural identities are strong enough — in terms of the weight managers put on their co-workers’ payoff — the group-size effect outweighs the negative effort effect under centralization in state $\theta = 1$. Then, we have a dynamic complementarity in the evolution of organizational culture. This implies divergent dynamics, which eventually drive organizational culture to a corner at $\mu = 0$ or $\mu = 1$.

**Equilibrium cultural evolution** To state our main result, we define a critical value of organizational culture, $\bar{\mu}(\beta)$ in the intermediate region of (9), at which\footnote{This is the value of $\mu$ at which $e^*(\nu(\bar{\mu})) [2\alpha - 1 + \xi(\bar{\mu} + \alpha - 1)] + (1 - \beta)e^*[1 - \nu(\bar{\mu})][1 - 2\alpha + (\bar{\mu} - \alpha)] = 0$, where $\nu(\mu) = \gamma(0)$.}

$$\Delta(\mu) = \beta \delta_H(\mu) + (1 - \beta)\delta_L(\mu) = 0.$$ 

If $\beta$ is close enough to $1/2$, then $\bar{\mu}(\beta) \in [0, 1]$ always exists and the dynamics of the model are described by:
Proposition 2

Under Assumption 1 and $\xi \geq \hat{\xi}$, there are three cases

1. If $\beta$ is close enough to 1, a type-0 culture emerges in the long run (i.e., $\lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t = 1$) from any starting value $\mu_0 > 0$.

2. If $\beta$ is close enough to 0, a type-1 culture emerges in the long run (i.e., $\lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t = 0$) from any starting value $\mu_0 < 1$.

3. If $\beta$ is such that $\tilde{\mu}(\beta) \in [\mu_L, \mu_H]$ then – if $\mu_0 > \tilde{\mu}(\beta)$, a type-0 culture emerges in the long run ($\lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t = 1$), while if $\mu_0 < \tilde{\mu}(\beta)$ a type-1 culture emerges in the long run ($\lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t = 0$).

In the first two cases, the organization’s long-run culture complies with the more frequent aggregate state. In Case 3, an intermediate range for $\beta$ supports any one of the stable steady states. However, for each and every initial condition for $\mu$ (and a specific value of $\beta$), the dynamics are still unique.

5.3 Insights from the model

We now show what the model has to say about the following four questions: (i) how do organizational cultures and designs interact? (ii) can different organizational cultures coexist under the same fundamentals? (iii) may dysfunctional cultures survive in the long run? and (iv) when do sticky organizational cultures lead to inertia in adapting to a changing environment?

(i) Organizational culture and design?  

Propositions 1 and 2 show that there is no deterministic relation between organizational design and culture since it may depend on realizations of $\theta$. Notwithstanding this, when $\beta$ is high enough for Case 1, the organization sees a steadily increasing type-0 culture, together with decentralization in most periods (since $\theta = 0$ in most periods for high $\beta$). When $\beta$ is low enough for Case 2, we instead see a trend towards a type-1 culture, and centralization most of the time. In both cases, the organization looks predominantly “peaceful” with few periods of conflict between the leader and senior managers.

In Case 3, when $\beta$ is in an intermediate range, either of these long-term outcomes can occur depending on the initial condition. Conditional on the realizations of $\theta$, the organization will flip back and forth between centralization and decentralization. When centralized, the organization will appear
conflict-ridden, which in turn means having lower productivity as centralization demotivates lower management to put in lower effort.

(ii) Coexistence? Similar organizations can be on divergent paths, depending on initial conditions. To be precise, suppose two organizations engage in the same activity, sharing parameters $\{\beta, \lambda, u, l, \xi\}$, and functional forms $e^*(\gamma)$ and $\Pi$. Assume also that parameter $\beta$ lies in the intermediate range of Case 3 in Proposition 2, but the two organizations have different initial values $\mu_0$ on opposite sides of the “critical juncture” for culture, namely $\tilde{\mu}(\beta)$. In the long run, we will then observe one organization with a type-0 culture and another with a type-1 culture.

This importance of initial cultures suggests that it would be interesting to extend the model with outside hiring. We conjecture that such an extension would give the result that bringing new managers is most effective at cultures close to critical juncture $\tilde{\mu}(\beta)$, assuming that social identities are portable across organizations.

While these are interesting observations, our analysis so far does not allow for interactions between different organizations. Since firms, bureaucracies, and political parties typically interact, this is an important omission. In the next section, we study different applications of the theory and some of these allow for implicit or explicit interactions between different organizations. In these cases, we ask if different organizational cultures may still coexist in the same market or the same polity. We also ask if stiffer competition between organizations tend to create homogenous cultures.

(iii) Dysfunctional cultures? To explore the possibility of dysfunctional cultures, we look at long-run payoffs. To obtain a sharper result, assume that the leader’s payoff satisfies (3), as in most our applications below. Then, we have:

**Proposition 3** If the leader’s per-period payoff is multiplicative, it is greater or smaller for $\mu = 1$ than for $\mu = 0$ depending on

$$
\beta \pi (0, 0) \begin{cases} 
\geq & (1 - \beta) \pi (1, 1) \\
\leq & + \left[ \frac{e^* (1 - \alpha) (1 - \alpha) \left[ \pi (1, 0) \beta - \pi (0, 1) (1 - \beta) \right]}{e^* (1) - e^* (1 - \alpha) \alpha} \right]
\end{cases}
$$

20
As \( \beta \to 1, \mu = 1 \) (\( \beta \to 0, \mu = 0 \)) Proposition 2 says that a long-run type-0 (type-1) culture emerges, which is indeed the best one from the leader’s viewpoint. The interesting case is therefore a less predictable environment where \( \beta \) is close to \( \frac{1}{2} \) and the steady state depends on initial conditions. Then, the organization may not converge to the culture that maximizes long-run payoffs. Indeed for \( \beta \) close to \( \frac{1}{2} \), the gain to the leader from her preferred long-run culture can be arbitrarily large depending on how \((0, 0)\) compares to \((1, 1)\). Hence, highly dysfunctional cultures can emerge.

We have assumed that the leader has only a one-period horizon. However, the important issue is not whether the horizon is short or long, but whether or not the leader can commit. To see this, we first express the period-\( t \) reduced-form payoff as a function \( \Pi(\theta_t, \mu_t, o(\theta_t)) \) of \( \theta_t \) the aggregate state, \( \mu_t \) culture (the single state variable), and \( o(\theta_t) \) the state-dependent centralization/decentralization choice. Second, express \( \mu_t \) as a reduced-form function \( \mu_t = \tilde{T}(\mu_0, o_{t-1}) \) of \( \mu_0 \) its initial value, and \( o_{t-1} \) the history of state-dependent design choices up until period \( t - 1 \), which includes all effects on cultural transmission via relative fitness values \( \Delta \) in the law of motion for \( \mu \).

Then we can write the expected discounted payoff at 0 as

\[
W([o(\theta_t)_{t=0}^{\infty}, \mu_0]) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} D^t \left[ \beta \tilde{\Pi}(0, \tilde{T}(\mu_0, o_{t-1}), o(0)) + (1 - \beta) \tilde{\Pi}(1, \tilde{T}(\mu_0, o_{t-1}), o(1)) \right],
\]

where \( D \leq 1 \) is a discount factor.

Suppose that the \( t = 0 \) leader could commit herself to a sequence of policy rules for every future period. The optimal decisions maximizing (10) would be:

\[
o^*(\theta_t, \mu_0) \in \arg \max_{o(\theta_t) \in \{c, d\}} \{ W([o(\theta_t)_{t=0}^{\infty}, \mu_0]) \}.
\]

This sequence could well differ from the equilibrium we have studied. In particular, a leader who starts out with a dysfunctional culture, say \( \mu_0 = 1 \) with \( \beta < \frac{1}{2} \), may want to commit herself to a sequence of state-independent centralization, \( o(\theta_t) = c \) for any \( \theta_t \) to initiate a transition towards a type-1 culture. Any short-run losses will be dominated by long-run gains with the latter being particularly important when \( D \) is close enough to 1. The key strategic consideration is that committing to future policy rules will shape future relative fitness values \( \Delta_t \) and hence future cultures.

Suppose now the leader cannot commit to future policy rules, but still maximizes (10). Operating under such discretion, she takes all future leader
design choices as given. Moreover, as noted in Section 5.2, her current choice of \( o_t \) does not affect expected relative fitness (whether given by \( \Delta_t \) or \( \Delta_{t+1} \)) among current junior managers. Since these managers have a one-period horizon, the choice of \( o_t \) does not affect cultural transmission. As the leader cannot influence future cultures (state variables), there is no strategic effect on cultural dynamics to consider. Her optimal design thus simply maximizes the current payoff – i.e., the equilibrium is the one we have already studied, even if leaders have an infinite horizon.\(^5\)

To summarize, dysfunctional cultures may emerge, not because leaders are myopic but because they lack commitment. This observation ties our model to earlier discussions around the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960). In particular, it parallels Acemoglu (2003) who shows that lack of commitment by current decision-makers is the key impediment to efficiency in dynamic political models.

A possible substitute for commitment in our setting would be for the principals to delegate long-run control of the organization to a leader who favors one particular culture over another. This would be particularly relevant where the (unachievable) commitment path would prescribe either \( o_t = c \) or \( o_t = d \) for all time.\(^6\)

(iv) Organizational inertia? Another upshot from the model is that culture can be immune to change, even if some parameter values are permanently altered. Organizational cultures can thus limit adaptability, as in the IBM-example discussed in Section 3 above and further in Section 6.3 below. To illustrate, consider two values \( \beta_L, \beta_H \) such that

\[
\beta_H e^{\ast}(1 - \alpha)[2\alpha - 1 + \xi(\alpha - 1)] - (1 - \beta_H)\xi e^{\ast}(1) > 0.
\]

Under this assumption, the organization will converge globally to \( \mu = 1 \) when \( \beta = \beta_H \) (as per the condition in (9) and Proposition 2.)

\(^5\)Short horizons among the managers do play a role, however. If each generation of managers were to internalize the payoffs of group members, not only in their own generation but also in future generations of managers, strategic concerns among leaders may reappear.

\(^6\)This logic is reminiscent of that in Vickers (1985), where an oligopolistic firm seeking to maximize profits can raise profits by appointing a CEO with an objective to maximize sales as a way of committing to aggressive pricing behavior. Rogoff (1985) studies strategic delegation in the context of central banking.
What happens in such a corner solution if $\beta$ suddenly shifts to $\beta_L$? Given a starting point of $\mu = 1$, we obtain a form of hysteresis. From (9) and Proposition 2, for all $\beta$ such that
\[
\beta \xi e^*(1) + (1 - \beta) e^* (1 - \alpha) [1 - 2\alpha + (1 - \alpha)\xi] > 0
\] (12)
culture persists at point $\mu = 1$. This is because $\Delta (1) > 0$. From (12), there exists a critical value of $\beta$, given by
\[
\hat{\beta}_L = \frac{e^* (1 - \alpha) [2\alpha - 1 - (1 - \alpha)\xi]}{\xi e^*(1) + e^* (1 - \alpha) [2\alpha - 1 - (1 - \alpha)\xi]},
\] (13)
below which the culture will begin to change as $\Delta (1) < 0$ for all $\beta < \hat{\beta}_L$.

This result says that only large enough shifts in the environment will lead to cultural change. As $\hat{\beta}_L$ is decreasing in $\xi$, the sense of group loyalty which shapes organizational identity, the cultural friction is greater the stronger the more important is group loyalty. Our model thus conforms to the claim in the organizational literature that identity-based cultures naturally prevent organizational adaptability.

6 Applications

In this section, we put our general model to work and show how it can illuminate questions around the roles for culture and design of organizations such as bureaucracies, firms, and political parties. Making our general approach more specific also raises some new issues, which merit further analysis in future research.

6.1 Performance of Public Bureaucracies

One of the biggest puzzles about public organizations is the wide range of performance among units of government with similar technology and access to resources. Classic accounts of public bureaucracy, like Wilson (1989), emphasize culture and values as elements that can explain inertia and resistance to change. Because traditional performance management may have limited

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7 This implies that
\[
\beta \delta (1) + (1 - \beta) \delta_L (1) > 0.
\]
bite in bureaucracies such as police forces, hospitals and schools – where
public-service outputs are hard to measure, making incentive contracts hard
to implement – good service delivery may have to rely on intrinsic motiva-
tions of detectives, physicians, or teachers. Wilson (1989) also stresses that
we can think about effective bureaucracies as mission-oriented organizations
employing motivated agents, a suggestion picked up by Tirole (1994) and
Besley and Ghatak (2005).

Examples Applying insights from their analysis of private firms, Bloom et
al (2014, 2015) find the same differences in bureaucratic management as in
private management, and management styles systematically correlated with
bureaucratic performance indicators. Appeals to organizational culture are
commonplace in consulting reports on performance. A case in point is CHKS
(2012) – a report by the leading provider of health-care intelligence in the
UK – which concluded that

“top-performing acute sector organizations invest considerable time
and effort into developing an organizational culture around the deliv-
ery of high-quality, safe and efficient care” (p. 13).

Another salient example is a university with multiple priorities, including
good teaching and successful research. Corresponding to the leader in our
model, a dean who internalizes university priorities may look at future fund
raising or tuition fees. However, faculty members may have their own prior-
ities over teaching or research with a higher productivity when performing
the task they value the most. Moreover, cultural transmission from senior
faculty may be key to how junior faculty build such values.

Applying the model to bureaucracy In any kind of bureaucracy, a key
issue is how much local discretion to allow. Leaders may be concerned that
decentralization will divert attention from its top priorities. Our framework
helps understand the challenges of building an organizational culture which
serves the ultimate beneficiaries such as crime victims, patients, or students.

To fit this context, we interpret $\omega$ as different units of provision such
police precincts, hospitals, or schools. The choices $\rho(\omega, \theta)$ reflect aspects of
the mission such as which crime to focus on, which medical treatments to
prioritize, or what curriculum to teach. The variable $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$ reflects the
leader’s beliefs about the organization’s priorities, while $\sigma(\omega, \theta)$ allows the
possibility of tailoring the mission to local factors. In this application, lower-tier managers are the professionals who deliver services. While, in practice, not every front-line professional becomes a senior manager, promotions of professionals are a major source of recruitment, e.g., school principals are often former teachers.

When applying our general framework to bureaucracy, we assume that the organizational objective is multiplicative and symmetric, as in (3) and (4)

\[
\Pi \left( \lambda (2x - 1)^2, \int_0^1 \pi \left( |\rho (\omega, \theta) - \sigma (\omega, \theta)|, \theta \right) d\omega, e \right) = \text{(14)}
\]

\[
\hat{\phi} (x) e \int \pi \left( |\rho (\omega, \theta) - \sigma (\omega, \theta)|, \theta \right) d\omega,
\]

where \( \hat{\phi} (x) = \frac{1 + \lambda [2x - 1] ^2}{1 + \lambda} \) captures the possibility of spillovers across service providers leading to coordination gains and \( \pi (1, 1) = \pi (0, 0) = \pi_H > \pi (0, 1) = \pi (1, 0) = \pi_L \) i.e., there is no intrinsic advantage to any possible priority. Hence

\[
\int \pi \left( |\rho (\omega, \theta) - \sigma (\omega, \theta)|, \theta \right) d\omega = \pi_L + (\pi_H - \pi_L) [\theta + \mu - 2\mu \theta]
\]

with decentralization. All the results in Propositions 1-3 apply straightforwardly in this case.\(^8\)

The model sheds light on three frequently discussed features of public bureaucracies: (i) dilemmas of top-down control, (ii) heterogeneous performance, not explained by resources or technologies, and (iii) institutional inertia and resistance to reform.

**Dilemmas of top-down control** How much local control to offer in the delivery of public services has been discussed in research on education and health-care provision (see e.g., Wilson 1989 and Ahmad et al. 2005). It is frequently claimed that decentralization works best to take advantage of local conditions when the objectives of the center and delivery units are strongly aligned.

\(^8\)In this case, the condition in Proposition 3 boils down to

\[
(1 - 2\beta) \left[ \frac{c^* (1) - \alpha e^* (1 - \alpha)}{(1 - \alpha) e^* (1 - \alpha)} \right] \leq (1 - 2\beta) \frac{\pi_L}{\pi_H}.
\]
Our model emphasizes that alignment can evolve dynamically reflecting past experience with centralized or decentralized control. Proposition 2 shows that culture supports the center’s long-run objectives when the centre’s goals are clearly defined, i.e., $\beta$ is close to 0 or 1. Tension is more likely when the environment is more uncertain, so that $\beta$ is close to $\frac{1}{2}$ when different cultures may emerge for the same fundamentals.

The model suggests that top-down control occurs when the center and delivery units are poorly aligned, i.e. Proposition 2 shows that if $\beta$ is close to 0 or 1, clashing interests are unusual, which raises organizational efficiency, i.e. increases effort. However, when $\beta$ is close to $\frac{1}{2}$ conflict between leaders and management and inefficiency due to lower managerial effort are more common. So mission clarity can be associated with better performance, as suggested in Wilson (1989).

**Heterogeneous performance** Our model speaks directly to the central puzzle that bureaucratic performance may differ in apparently similar organizations. This is true in case 3 of Proposition 2, where close to $\bar{\mu}(\beta)$ organizational units may follow different paths. If state $\theta$ is common across organizations, then at a point in time when $\theta = 0 \ (\theta = 1)$ organizations with a culture approaching $\mu = 1$ will perform better (worse) than those with $\mu$ approaching 0.

**Institutional inertia and resistance to reform** The difficulty in reforming public bureaucracies due to entrenched culture is frequently discussed in the management literature (e.g., Gioia and Thomas 1996, for academia). To understand this in our framework, imagine that parameter $\beta$ permanently changes at a time where a bureaucratic organization has achieved a steady state with either $\mu = 1$ or $\mu = 0$. Then, organizational culture may not adapt at all due to an entrenched managerial culture. The organization can try to handle this by centralizing, but will suffer from low efficiency due to low effort $e^*(1 - \alpha)$ with centralization, rather than $e^*(1)$ with decentralization.

Even if the change in $\beta$ is sufficiently large to set in motion a cultural dynamic towards a new steady state, this may be a slow process with the length of the transition being dependent on the generational structure of managers. It will also depend on the rate of labor-market turnover, an aspect we have abstracted from. In future work, it will be interesting to consider the role of hiring and firing and to allow for (at least partial) portability of
cultures across organizations.

6.2 Firms, Productivity, and Corporate Cultures

In many ways, a public bureaucracy of civil servants is similar to a private bureaucracy of managers. The insights from the previous subsection thus largely carry over. However, a private firm may be subject to a harder budget constraint, as it has to survive in the market place. This might suggest that the problem of inefficient cultures should be diminished in market settings. To consider these issues, we apply a version of our model that can generate heterogeneous firm productivities and possibly link them to different management styles, as studied by Bloom and van Reenen with different coauthors. Specifically, we use a “span-of-control” model as in Lucas (1978), where managers in each division can hire workers and the leader is a profit-motivated CEO.

Technology Suppose the productivity of each division in the firm is given by

\[ \nu (\mid \rho (\omega , \theta) - \sigma (\omega , \theta) \mid , \theta , e , x) \right\sqcup = \left[ \hat{\phi} (x) \pi (\mid \rho (\omega , \theta) - \sigma (\omega , \theta) \mid , \theta) \e \right] ^{1-\zeta} , \]

where \( \hat{\phi} (x) = \frac{1 + \lambda [2^x - 1]^2}{1 + \lambda} \) reflects the value of coordination for productivity.\(^9\)

We continue to work with the symmetric case where \( \pi (\mid \rho (\omega , \theta) - \sigma (\omega , \theta) \mid , \theta) \) satisfies (4). Independently of the firm’s organization, the division can hire labor \( l (\omega) \) with a decreasing-returns production function: \( \nu ^{1-\zeta} l ^\zeta \) where \( \zeta < 1 \).

Laborers \( l \) can be freely hired at wage \( w \).

We can now ask how organizational culture shapes the firm’s management style – embodied in \( \rho (\omega , \theta) \) – which, in turn, shapes organization design. The latter choice can affect the firm’s profitability, which also depends on culture as embodied in \( \mu \). Aggregate shock \( \theta \) reflects different states of the world, where different management activities are more or less productive. Parameter \( \beta \) captures how the firm’s CEO evaluates these managerial decisions. A culture clash arises when upper-tier managers have a proclivity towards activities which are counterproductive for the firm.

\(^9\) We normalize by \( (1 + \lambda) \) so that coordinated firms do not become unboundedly more productive as \( \lambda \) gets large.
Hiring and profits Suppose the firm’s output has price $p$. Then the profitability of a division optimizing its hiring decision is:

$$\max_l \left\{ p \nu (\rho (\omega, \theta), \theta, e, x)^{1-\zeta} l^c - w l \right\} = (1 - \zeta) \hat{\zeta} (w) p^{1-\zeta} \hat{\phi} (x) \pi (|\rho (\omega, \theta) - \sigma (\omega, \theta)|, \theta) e,$$

where $\hat{\zeta} (w) = \left( \frac{w}{\xi} \right)^{-\frac{\xi}{1-\xi}}$. In this setting, division-level and firm-level heterogeneities depend on recruitment and project decisions by upper-tier managers – think about the latter as the firm’s "management style". In this sense, the model in this subsection provides a microfoundation for the empirical analysis in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).

Firm profits – the CEO’s objective – has the form in (3), i.e.,

$$\Pi \left( \lambda (2x - 1)^2, \left[ \int_0^1 \pi (|\rho (\omega, \theta) - \sigma (\omega, \theta)|, \theta) d\omega \right], e \right)$$

$$= (1 - \zeta) \hat{\zeta} (w) p^{1-\zeta} \hat{\phi} (x) [\pi_L + (\pi_H - \pi_L) [\theta + \mu - 2\mu \theta]] e.$$

Profits are greater when managers put in more effort ($e$ is high), when the firm is better coordinated ($\mu$ close to zero or one), and when divisions are better aligned with local conditions ($\rho (\omega, \theta)$ and $\sigma (\omega, \theta)$ fit better together) given state $\theta$.

Centralized control, management form, and firm heterogeneity This application also maps into our general model, so that Propositions 1-3 all apply. It suggests a foundation for Bloom et al (2012), who find that decentralized firms have better performance. However, our model predicts that decentralization, management culture, managerial effort, and firm performance are all jointly determined. Thus a complex web of causal interdependencies run between these outcomes. We should expect selection into decentralization only when this has a positive impact on performance. The model can also explain a clash between leaders who represent shareholder interests and operational managers, the former wishing to limit the discretion of the latter. This is a feature of the IBM example discussed in Section 3.

More generally, our model can explain persistent heterogeneities in productivity and profits among firms, when the same market conditions and technologies are available to them. Firms that evolve better cultures will be
more productive and profitable. Our framework suggests that homogenous firms are only likely to emerge when $\beta$ is close to zero or one – i.e., when the environment is highly predictable and supports one specific organizational culture. When firms may face different challenges, different cultures can emerge and one of these can be better for (average) productivity.

**Market selection and inefficient cultures** As mentioned, a key difference between public services and private firms is that market discipline can bound cultural inefficiencies of the latter. We now explore this idea, focusing on the case where $\lambda = 0$ – i.e., we abstract from coordination gains. To stay in business in each period, a firm has to incur a fixed cost $F$ (in terms of labor), which is paid before $\theta$ is realized. This way, market selection may only allow firms with certain cultures to carry on operating.

Suppose that prices and wages, $p$ and $w$, are exogenously fixed and that
\[
(1 - \zeta) \hat{\zeta}(w) p^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}} \pi_H e^* (1) - wF > 0,
\]
which says that a maximally efficient firm is viable given the fixed cost $F$. In our model, this level of efficiency is never attainable if $\beta \in (0, 1)$. With an interior value of $\beta$, firms will converge to a culture which entails an efficiency loss in either state $\theta = 0$ or state $\theta = 1$, as managers have to act against their preferences.

Can both type-0 and type-1 cultures coexist, or does the market constraint make one of them infeasible? To probe this, suppose $\beta$ belongs to the range in Proposition 2, where firms may evolve into either culture $\mu = 1$ or culture $\mu = 0$.

We want to give a condition for the coexistence of both cultures. Define bounds
\[
\hat{\pi}_0 = \beta \pi_H e^* (1) + (1 - \beta) \left[ \alpha \pi_H + (1 - \alpha) \pi_L \right] e^* (1 - \alpha)
\]
and
\[
\hat{\pi}_1 = (1 - \beta) \pi_H e^* (1) + \beta \left[ \alpha \pi_H + (1 - \alpha) \pi_L \right] e^* (1 - \alpha)
\]
for cultures $\mu = 1$ and $\mu = 0$ respectively. Given the symmetric payoffs, $\hat{\pi}_0 > \hat{\pi}_1$ if and only if $\beta > 1/2$. Then, we have

**Proposition 4** In the long-run, cultures $\mu = 1$ and $\mu = 0$ can coexist iff
\[
\min \{ \hat{\pi}_1, \hat{\pi}_0 \} \geq \frac{wF}{(1 - \zeta) \hat{\zeta}(w) p^{\frac{1}{1-\zeta}}},
\]
The proposition bounds the inefficiency among firms with different long-run cultures. Via the LHS of the inequality, this bound depends on the predictability of the aggregate environment, $\beta$, the correlation across divisions, $\alpha$, and the efficiency loss due to low effort $e^*(1) - e^*(1 - \alpha)$. Via the RHS of the inequality, the bound also depends on $w$, $p$, and $F$. Coexistence is more likely when fixed costs are low or real product wages are low (so profits are high), both contributing to a weak market test.

With coexistence, one culture becomes relatively dysfunctional. Which one depends on whether $\beta \geq \frac{1}{2}$. Thus our model offers a particular take on the observation that firms in the same market sometimes operate with persistently different productivities. Moreover, as in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), this could be associated with persistently different management styles with management focusing on different problems and tackling them in different ways.

If the inequality in Proposition 4 fails, the market will eventually weed out one of the cultures. Unsurprisingly, a hard budget constraint reduces long-run permissible cultural inefficiencies. Shifts in market conditions which lower $p$ or raise $w$ – like deregulation or opening to trade – may thus help eliminate inefficient cultures.\(^\text{10}\)

### 6.3 Culture and Management in IBM

Section 3 discussed IBM’s challenge to adapt its culture to a new product line. Our model can be used to inform this. Suppose that the firm can

\(^\text{10}\) Our model also predicts that the aggregate distribution of corporate cultures will affect the equilibrium price in a market, with more efficient cultures leading to lower market prices and hence tightening the selection condition. Suppose that there is a continuum of firms in an industry and a constant elasticity demand curve, $p = Q^{-\varepsilon}$, with elasticity $\varepsilon$ with $Q(\theta)$ denoting total industry output in state $\theta$ with $\theta$ common to all firms. Suppose a proportion $\Omega(\theta)$ of firms has evolved a culture where the management is aligned with the firm in state $\theta$. Then the equilibrium price in state $\theta$ is

$$p(\theta) = \left(\zeta(w) [\Omega(\theta) \pi_H e^*(1) + (1 - \Omega(\theta)) (\alpha \pi_H + (1 - \alpha) \pi_L) e]\right)^{-\frac{1}{\varepsilon}}.$$ 

Note that prices are lower in states of the world that favor the dominant industry culture. Similar arguments would apply if wages were allowed to be endogenous then they would depend positively on having more firms with the more productive culture. This creates a spillover – more efficient cultures in aggregate would drive up wages and put further pressure on firms with poor cultures.
specialize in one of two products: mainframes, \( M \) and PCs, \( P \). Let \( \pi_M(\theta) \) and \( \pi_P(\theta) \) be divisional profits associated with two conditions, summarized by aggregate state \( \theta \), with \( \pi_M(0) > \pi_P(0) \) and \( \pi_M(1) < \pi_P(1) \). Finally, a share \( \mu \) of managers have \( \tau(\omega) = 0 \) and adopt a mainframe-oriented culture, while those with \( \tau(\omega) = 1 \) adopt a PC-oriented culture. Hence, managers focus on projects enhancing the products they identify with.

With the multiplicative performance function in (3), the firm’s profits (leader’s payoff) become

\[
\lambda(2x - 1)^2 \left[ \pi_M(\theta) y(\theta) + \pi_P(\theta) (1 - y(\theta)) \right] e,
\]

where \( y(\theta) \) is the share of divisions that adopt mainframe-enhancing activities in state \( \theta \). Under these assumptions, Propositions 1-3 apply.

Consider a firm like the old IBM, where \( \mu = \beta = 1 \), due to cultural convergence as in Proposition 2. Because the state is always \( \theta = 0 \), this firm is decentralized, and all lower-tier managers are motivated to put in effort \( e^*(1) \). Moreover, the uniform culture and work habits are fully coordinated on mainframes with \( y(0) = x = 1 \). Profits are thus \( \lambda[\pi_M(0)]e^*(1) \).

**Changing market conditions** What happens if \( \beta \) falls, making state \( \theta = 1 \) more common, as PCs becomes more attractive? In state \( \theta = 1 \), the leader optimally responds by centralizing and imposing PC-oriented projects on all divisions, since \( \pi_M(1) < [\pi_P(1) \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \pi_M(1)] \). As local information is lost, this will lead to some advances in PCs and some in mainframes (by “mis-directed” managers). Profits are now \( \lambda[\pi_P(1) \alpha + (1 - \alpha) \pi_M(1)]e^*(1 - \alpha) \).

These profits are lower than the profits of a firm with a PC culture, \( \mu = 0 \). Such a firm elicits full effort \( e^*(1) \) from its managers, and can decentralize projects to get better aligned decisions. This gives profits \( \pi_P(1) \) for all divisions, and aggregate profits \( \lambda[\pi_P(1)]e^*(1) \). Due to lower efforts and some misdirected managers, IBM will look like “an elephant learning to tap dance”, compared to firms with PC-oriented cultures.\(^\text{12}\)

**Adaptation or not?** So will IBM adapt? This depends on how managers perceive the change in \( \beta \). Following the analysis in Section 5, if the “death of the mainframe” is still in doubt – such that \( \beta \) is higher than \( \hat{\beta}_L \) defined in

\(^{11}\)Here, \( \pi_P(1) = \pi(1,1), \pi_M(1) = \pi(0,1), \pi(0) = \pi(1,0), \) and \( \pi_M(0) = \pi(0,0) \)

\(^{12}\)See the discussion in Rantakari (2008, Section 7) for a somewhat different perspective on the centralization, decentralization decisions at IBM in the 1980s.
(13) – culture may not change. This is especially likely with a strong *esprit de corps* among the managers (high $\xi$). If and when $\beta$ falls further in the new environment, cultural change begins. But during the transition, IBM has to wait for sufficiently many managers to turn over in the socialization process.

This analysis illustrates not only the narrative of IBM and its slow adaptability due to a strong culture. It also captures similar concerns nowadays expressed about Google, as it tries to adapt to greater competition and new product lines – e.g., taking on Facebook and providing mobile apps.

This discussion suggests a trade-off. Strong organizational cultures can be very powerful in stable environments. But they create inertia and risk becoming dysfunctional when adaptation is necessary. It would be interesting in further work to combine this insight with the analysis of market selection in Subsection 6.2. We conjecture that the market may eventually weed out “dinosaur” cultures, but this process may be slower if competition is weak.\textsuperscript{13}

### 6.4 Political Parties

To fit our model to political parties, we focus on the role of party activists in putting in effort to increase the probability of winning, which also depends on local and national policy priorities. Moreover, the emergence of party cultures interacts with party organization and party culture is now a slow-moving variable which can explain persistence in electoral fortunes. Effective parties have a harmonious compact between activists and party leaders which also mirrors what voters want.

Our focus on culture opens up a novel dimension of politics. Although some discussions have emphasized that centralized authority is sometimes needed (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 2003), the dynamic implications for emergent party cultures does not seem to have been considered. Our analysis relates to studies of Latin American political such as Willis et al (1999) who argue convincingly that the different party structures – centralized in Mexico and decentralized in Brazil – have a bearing on political power.

\textsuperscript{13}The model could also be developed to try to incorporate some of the insights of Atkin et al (2017) which shows how in their context managers and workers aligned on the “wrong” decision so that the new better technology fails to be adopted.
Voter preferences The organizations are now two competing parties $P = A, B$. Each has a leader who runs a multi-division structure where local district (or group) party heads are like our upper-tier managers and grassroots party activists are like our lower-tier managers. In each period, the leader maximizes the party’s probability of winning an election which takes place at the end of the period.

Voters are partitioned into a continuum of districts (or groups), indexed by $\omega$. All voters in district (or group) $\omega$ have identical preferences:

$$W(\theta, \omega, x, e) = \lambda (2x - 1)^2 + \pi \left( |\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta \right) \cdot e(\omega) + D_B \chi. \quad (16)$$

The first term represents some need for a nationally coordinated policy, where $\lambda$ indexes the importance of coordination. The second term captures a policy targeted to district $\omega$, magnified by the effort $e(\omega)$ local party workers put into policy design. Furthermore, voters get an extra $\chi$ of utility under party-$B$ rule: $\chi$ being a popularity shock in favor of party $B$, continuously distributed with mean zero, $E(\chi) = 0$, and a symmetric single-peaked density. By symmetry, c.d.f. $\Pi$ of $\chi$ has $\Pi(0) = 1/2$. The $\chi$-shock is realized after policy-design choices at stage 5, but before the election in each period. When $\theta = 1$ ($\theta = 0$) voter preferences accord with those of type-1 (type-0) district leaders, which occurs with probability $1 - \beta$ (probability $\beta$). Again we work with (4) but normalize $\pi_H = 1$ and $\pi_L = 0$.

Winning probabilities As parties offer policies $\{\rho^P(\omega, \theta), x_P, e_P(\omega)\}$, voters in district $\omega$ vote for party $A$ if

$$\chi \leq W^A(\theta, \omega, x, e) - W^B(\theta, \omega, x, e).$$

Observe also that

$$\int W^P(\theta, \omega, x, e)d\omega = \lambda(2x_P - 1)^2 + e_P \cdot [(1 - \theta)x_P + \theta(1 - x_P)]$$

is a function only of aggregate choices and effort. Standard arguments allow us to write party $A$’s probability of winning the entire election as

$$p(\theta) = \text{Prob}[\chi \leq \int W^A(\theta, \omega, x, e)d\omega - \int W^B(\theta, \omega, x, e)d\omega]$$

$$= \Pi(\int W^A(\theta, x, e) - W^B(\theta, x, e)\). \quad (17)$$
Party $B$’s probability of winning is just given by $1 - p(\theta)$.

Substituting from (16) into (17), the probability of winning for party $A$ is

$$
\Pi \left( \lambda (2x - 1)^2, \int \pi(|\rho(\omega, \theta) - \sigma(\omega, \theta)|, \theta) \, d\omega - W^B(\theta, x, e) \right). 
$$

(18)

Depending on $\theta$, the leader organizes the party (and picks a set of local policies under centralization) so as to maximize the probability of winning, taking the organization and policies of party $B$ as given. This objective fits our general model so Propositions 1 and 2 can be applied.

**Decentralization and party cultures**  Green parties in European countries, such Germany and Sweden, started out in the 1970s and 1980s as decentralized (grass-roots) organizations where local party workers engaged in local environmental projects and resisted nuclear power. In the early 1990s, issues like German integration and the Swedish economic crisis became much more salient which is like a shift in the aggregate state $\theta$. Green parties then started to take part in regional and national coalition governments which can be thought of as an upward shift in $\lambda$ (the weight placed on having coordinated rather than locally driven policies). These shifts in the political environment made party leaders adopt more centralized policies leading to complaints among party activists as well as past leaders. The model interprets these developments as changing party strategies which are rational responses to a change in focus in policy priorities as perceived by party leaders.

Our model adds the possibility that these changing party objectives might also gradually change prevailing party cultures. In particular, Proposition 2 suggests that a different party culture might emerge. To illustrate this, consider a value of $\beta$ in the intermediate range identified in Proposition 2, such that case 3 applies. Further, assume that the initial values of $\mu$ in the two parties lie on opposite sides of critical value $\tilde{\mu}(\beta)$. To fix ideas, suppose that

$$
\tilde{\mu}_A < \tilde{\mu}(\beta) < \tilde{\mu}_B.
$$

Then, Proposition 2 says that party $A$ evolves a long-run party culture with $\mu_A = 1$, and party $B$ one where $\mu_B = 0$, where both cultures are associated with loyal party workers. Both party cultures may coexist and, as we see below, one party could spend more time in office even if party fundamentals
are similar, on the back of a different party organization. In the long run, parties may or may not be decentralized, depending on the value of $\lambda$, i.e., how valuable coordination is to winning. Studying this further in specific contexts would be interesting.

A competitive cultural advantage? To see how a party culture can become an electoral asset or liability, consider the case where $\mu^A = 1$ and $\mu^B = 0$. The win probability for party $A$ is then $p^A = \Pi(W^{A*} - W^{B*})$, where $W^{P*}$ denotes the equilibrium utility offered by party $P$ to the aggregate of voters. Party $A$ has an electoral advantage with $p^A \gtrless 1/2$ as $\Pi(W^{A*} - W^{B*}) \gtrless 1/2$. Under these conditions, we have

**Proposition 5** Suppose that $\mu_L > 0$ and $\mu_H < 1$ and party $A$ has a type-0 culture while party $B$ has a type-1 culture. Then party $A$’s winning probability $p^A(\theta) = 1 - p^B(\theta)$ is given by:

$$p^A(\theta) = \Pi \left( [1 - 2\theta] \left[ e^* (1) - \alpha e^* (1 - \alpha) + \lambda (2\alpha - 1)^2 - \lambda \right] \right).$$

Formally, suppose that $\theta = 0$. If both parties were to decentralize, then $x = \alpha$ for both. However, $\pi = e^*(1)$ for $A$ and $\pi = 0$ for $B$. Thus, $B$ must centralize to compete with $A$. Then, voters get $\lambda + \alpha e^*(1 - \alpha) + \chi$ under party $B$-rule and $\lambda (2\alpha - 1)^2 + e^*(1)$ under party $A$-rule. Therefore, $A$ has an electoral advantage (disadvantage) due its culture when $\theta = 0$ ($\theta = 1$) and $\alpha$ is high.

Intuitively, this advantage due to culture comes from two sources: the ability to motivate party workers and better alignment with local interests. When $\theta = 0$, the party is decentralized and can take advantage of the motivated party workers; moreover the center and local party managers are aligned. Since the same $\theta$ shock hits both parties, party $B$ has to centralize to compete, but this throws away local information and stops local party managers tailoring their campaigns to local interests. It also means that fewer party workers are motivated since the center is pushing against local party managers. While $B$ has an advantage over $A$ in that it compels greater coordination among party workers, such an advantage diminishes when $\alpha$ is close to 1.

On this view, the party culture most suitable for winning elections is context specific. Electoral success depends on the realization of $\theta$ in the short run and on the value of $\beta$ in the long run. Differences in political advantage
due to party culture will be larger with stronger political competition, represented by a higher density for popularity shock $\chi$ around its (zero) mean. This implies that any positive difference in $W^A - W^B$ maps into a larger difference in party A’s probability of winning the election.\footnote{To see this concretely suppose that $\chi$ is uniform on $[-1/M, 1/M]$ then $\Pi(Z) = \frac{1}{2} + MZ$, assuming an interior solution. A higher density (more intense competition) then corresponds to a higher value of $M$.}

Our earlier analysis can also explain why party cultures may not adapt to changed political circumstances, such as a permanent shift in $\beta$ which favors one party. Even though one party may want to modify its culture, this may be difficult, for the reasons explored above, giving it a lasting electoral disadvantage.

7 Final Remarks

Our main contribution is to study how social identities held by overlapping generations of managers give rise to cultural dynamics which interact with organizational design choices on how much to decentralize decision-making. The resulting model generates a range of insights into the interplay between organizational culture and design, with implications for performance. It identifies the precise conditions for different cultures to emerge. Whether the emerging culture leads the organization to be centralized or decentralized is endogenous and depends on internal conflicts of interest reflecting tensions between the prevailing culture and the leader’s objectives. This analysis captures a key tension when top management tries to change an organization by “taking back control” once cultural practices have become entrenched. We show how these general ideas apply to specific organizational contexts.

Our framework could be extended in various ways. Hirschman (1970) famously emphasized three sources of organizational dynamics: exit, voice, and loyalty. Here, we have focused on loyalty, as embedded in social identity. But the model could also include exit and voice. Exit would reflect organizations under stress hiring outside managers with different cultural convictions to by-pass inside managers socialized into dysfunctional modes of behavior. It would be interesting to consider such hiring by embedding organizations in a market for managers. Voice would reflect managers having a more direct say in a centralized organization. For example, allowing senior managers to vote over the organization’s mission – like the $\rho$ chosen under centralization
– would give an advantage to a majority culture. But one could study a variety of different governance mechanisms, including the selection of leaders and insiders’ say in the selection process.

A wider set of issues about organizational governance and leadership could also be explored in our framework. For example, tasking a leader with a particular objective could have a long-run transformational effect. But a leader may also create short-run unhappiness by demotivating existing managers, as she attempts to transform the prevailing culture. Leader monitoring and evaluation will then be important – e.g., whether poor short-term performance is tolerated and not interpreted as the result of incompetence. Stories abound about leaders who attempt to change the culture of an organization, but are being edged out due to protests by disgruntled insiders or complaints by owners oriented towards short-run profits.

A theory where leaders had a wider role would also be interesting. In our setting, leaders are confined to changing the authority structure. However, as already Weber (1922) emphasized, charismatic leaders can catalyze cultural change, quite apart from the sticks and carrots at their disposal. In terms of our analysis, leaders would somehow have a more direct effect on $\mu_t$. This would be a top-down model of organizational culture, in contrast to ours which is more bottom-up. It would also enable an exploration of when cultural dynamics can be the product of strategic decision making.

Finally, we have focused on how organizations adapt their design to endogenously changing values. We believe the idea of linking cultural and institutional change is a promising way of exploring societal dynamics in many contexts. In Besley and Persson (2018), we study how evolving democratic values interact with reforms of democratic institutions. More research on the interplay between formal rules and cultural values could help us better understand the drivers of economic success and failure.
References


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Appendix

A Derivation of \( q(\mu) \) and \( Q(\Delta) \)

Culture in the sense of the share of type-0 managers evolves over time. We have deliberately simplified by assuming that all upper-tier managers leave each period, and all lower-tier managers are promoted. Therefore, \( \mu_{t+1} \) is pinned down by the way types are transmitted from upper-tier to lower-tier managers in period \( t \).

A microfounded socialization mechanism One possible transmission mechanism builds on direct and indirect socialization. Let us assume that being randomly matched with an upper-tier manager at stage 4 of the period involves a mentoring component. This mentoring helps determine the lower-tier manager’s type, which becomes relevant once he is promoted.

If a lower-tier manager is mentored by a type-0 manager, which happens with probability \( \mu_t \), we assume that he may acquire the same type, depending on the relative expected fitness of holding the two types as a senior manager in the next period. Specifically, let \( \Delta (\mu_{t+1}) = E[v(0, \omega, \theta) - v(1, \omega, \theta)] \) be tomorrow’s expected-utility difference between having type 0 and type 1 with a share of \( \mu_{t+1} \) type-0 managers in the organization. Then, a lower-tier manager becomes type 0 through mentoring if:

\[
\Delta (\mu_{t+1}) + \eta \geq 0,
\]

where \( \eta \) is a mean-zero, symmetrically distributed idiosyncratic shock with continuous distribution function \( G(\cdot) \). Thus the probability that that a new recruit mentored by a type-0 upper-tier manager himself becomes type 0 is just \( G(\Delta (\mu_{t+1})) \).

If such direct socialization fails, the lower-tier manager may still be indirectly socialized by observing and learning from other managers. The probability of indirectly becoming type 0 depends monotonically on the average fraction of such types in the organization, a kind of social learning postulated in much of the cultural-evolution literature. Assuming a linear relation, the probability of indirect socialization becomes \( (1 - G(\Delta (\mu_{t+1}))) \mu_t \).

Adding these expressions, the overall probability that a new recruit who is matched with a type-0 upper-tier manager himself acquires this type is:

\[
G(\Delta (\mu_{t+1})) + (1 - G(\Delta (\mu_{t+1}))) \mu_t.
\]
If a new lower-tier manager is matched with and mentored by a type-1 upper-tier manager, which happens with probability $1 - \mu_t$, he is never directly socialized into becoming type 0. On the other hand he is socialized into being type 1 if

$$\Delta \left( \mu_{t+1} \right) + \eta \leq 0.$$ 

Thus, $(1 - G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})))$ is the proportion of type-1 managers coming from such matches. The fraction $G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1}))$ of lower-tier managers who do not become type 1 in this way, can – as above – indirectly become type 0 depending on the aggregate fraction of type-0 upper-tier managers in the organization. The resulting probability of becoming a type-0 manager is $G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) \mu_t$.

Multiplying (19) with $\mu_t$, $G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) \mu_t$ with $1 - \mu_t$, and adding the resulting expressions, we can write the equation of motion for the share of type-0 managers as

$$\mu_{t+1} = \mu_t \left[ G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) + (1 - G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1}))) \mu_t \right] + (1 - \mu_t) G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) \mu_t$$

$$= \mu_t + (1 - \mu_t) \mu_t 2 \left[ G(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) - \frac{1}{2} \right].$$

(20)

The expression on the right-hand side in consistent with the assumptions made about $Q(\Delta)$ and $q(\mu_t)$ made in the text. Note that here $\Delta$ depends on tomorrow’s culture $\mu_{t+1}$.

**A Replicator Dynamic** An even simpler approach to the replicator dynamic is to suppose that there is matching between a young and old manager. The probability a type-1 senior manager does not convert the young manager to becoming a type 1 is

$$\rho_{10}(\mu_t) = \frac{E(v(0, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) - [\mu_t E(v(0, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) + (1 - \mu_t) E(v(1, \omega, \theta : \mu_t))]}{2\Delta}$$

$$= -(1 - \mu_t) \left[ \frac{\Delta(\mu_t)}{2\Delta} \right]$$

and the probability that a type 0 manager fails to convert the lower tier manager with whom he is matched to be type 0 is

$$\rho_{01}(\mu) = \frac{E(v(1, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) - [\mu_t E(v(0, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) + (1 - \mu_t) E(v(1, \omega, \theta : \mu_t))]}{2\Delta}$$

$$= \mu_t \left[ \frac{\Delta(\mu_t)}{2\Delta} \right]$$
with $\Delta(0) > -\bar{\Delta}$ and $\Delta(1) < \bar{\Delta}$. Then

$$\mu_{t+1} = \mu_t (1 - \rho_{10} (\mu_t)) + \rho_{01} (\mu_t) (1 - \mu_t)$$

$$= \mu_t + \mu_t (1 - \mu_t) \frac{\Delta(\mu_t)}{\Delta}.$$

To see the equivalence to the replicator dynamic note that

$$\mu_{t+1} = \mu_t + \mu_t (1 - \mu_t) \frac{\Delta(\mu_t)}{\Delta}$$

$$= \mu_t + \mu_t \{E(v(0, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) - [\mu_t E(v(0, \omega, \theta) : \mu_t) + (1 - \mu_t) E(v(1, \omega, \theta : \mu_t))]\}.$$

Sandholm (2010) discusses a range of micro-foundations for the replicator dynamic in population games.

### A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions

**Proof of Lemma 1** Given that the first and third arguments are the same in $\Pi(\ldots, \ldots)$, only the second argument matters. So $\rho(\theta)$ depends on maximizing average profits. Note that with centralization and $\theta = 0$, we have $\rho(0) = 0$ if

$$\alpha \pi(0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(1, 0) \geq \alpha \pi(1, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(0, 0).$$

If $\theta = 1$, then we have $\rho(1) = 0$ if

$$\alpha \pi(1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(0, 1) \geq \alpha \pi(0, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(1, 1).$$

Both inequalities hold strictly, since $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{2}$, $\pi(0, 0) > \pi(1, 0)$ and $\pi(1, 1) > \pi(0, 1)$.

**Proof of Proposition 1** Let $\theta = 0$ and define

$$\Pi(\lambda(2[\mu_H \alpha + (1 - \mu_H)](1 - \alpha)] - 1)^2, \mu_H \pi(0, 0) + (1 - \mu_H) \pi(1, 0), e)$$

$$= \Pi(\lambda, \alpha \pi(0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(1, 0), e),$$

which must have $\mu_H \geq \alpha \geq 1/2$. Because the LHS is increasing in $\mu$, part 1 follows.
Let $\theta = 1$ and define

$$
\Pi \left( \lambda (2 \mu_L \alpha + (1 - \mu_L)(1 - \alpha) - 1)^2, (1 - \mu_L) \pi (1, 1) + \mu_L \pi (0, 1), e \right) = 
$$

$$
= \Pi \left( \lambda, \alpha \pi (1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (0, 1), e \right),
$$

which must have $1 - \mu_L \geq \alpha \geq 1/2$. Because the LHS is decreasing in $\mu$, part 2 follows.

**Proof of Lemma 2** To prove this, we start from

$$
\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t = q(\mu_t) (1 - q(\mu_t)) Q(\Delta_t).
$$

Since $\Delta(\mu)$ and $q(\mu_t)$ are globally increasing for $\mu \in [0, 1]$, then $q(\mu) (1 - q(\mu)) > 0$ so that at $\Delta(\hat{\mu}) = 0$, we must have $\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t \geq 0$ for all $1 \geq \mu \geq \hat{\mu}$, while $\mu_{t+1} - \mu_t < 0$ for all $0 \leq \mu < \hat{\mu}$. The interior steady state is therefore unstable. Moreover since $q(1) = 1$ and $q(0) = 0$, then the fact that $\Delta(\mu)$ is globally increasing implies $Q(\Delta(1)) \geq 0 \geq Q(\Delta(0))$.

$$
\mu_{t+1} - 1 + \nu = q(\nu) (1 - q(1 - \nu)) Q(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) > 0
$$

$$
\mu_{t+1} - \nu = q(\nu) (1 - q(1 - \nu)) Q(\Delta(\mu_{t+1})) < 0
$$

for $\nu$ small enough. This implies that the steady states at $\mu = 0$ and $\mu = 1$ are stable.

**Proof of Lemma 3** From the definitions in the text, we can guarantee that $\Delta(\mu)$ is globally increasing if (i) $\hat{\delta}(\mu_H) \geq \delta_H(\mu_H)$ (ii) $\hat{\delta}(\mu_L) \leq \delta_L(\mu_L)$, and (iii) $\delta_L(\mu)$ increasing for $\mu \geq \alpha$. Define

$$
\Omega_H(\mu) = [\xi [2\mu - 1]] e^*(1) - e^*(\nu(\mu)) [2\alpha - 1 + \xi (\mu + \alpha - 1)]
$$

and note that (i) is equivalent to $\Omega_H(\mu_H) \geq 0$. This condition will hold for

$$
\xi \geq \frac{e^*(\nu(\mu)) [2\alpha - 1]}{[2\mu - 1] e^*(1) - e^*(\nu(\mu)) (\mu + \alpha - 1)].
$$

Next, define

$$
\Omega_L(\mu) = e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))[1 - 2\alpha + (\mu - \alpha)\xi] - [\xi [2\mu - 1]] e^*(1)
$$
and note that (ii) is equivalent to $\Omega_L(\mu_L) > 0$. This condition holds if

$$\xi \geq \frac{e^*(1 - \nu(\mu_L))[2\alpha - 1]}{[1 - 2\mu_L] e^*(1) - e^*(1 - \nu(\mu_L))(\alpha - \mu_L)].}$$

So we need $\xi$ to satisfy:

$$\xi \geq \max \left\{ \frac{e^*(1 - \nu(\mu_L))[2\alpha - 1]}{[1 - 2\mu_L] e^*(1) - e^*(1 - \nu(\mu_L))(\alpha - \mu_L)], \frac{e^*(\nu(\mu_H))[2\alpha - 1]}{\alpha - \mu_L} \right\}$$

Finally, we would like $\delta_L(\mu)$ to be increasing for all $\mu \geq \mu_H$. This is the case if

$$e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))\xi + (1 - 2\alpha) \frac{\partial e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))}{\partial \nu}[1 - 2\alpha + (\mu - \alpha)\xi] = e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))\xi + (1 - 2\alpha)^2 \frac{\partial e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))}{\partial \nu}[1 + \frac{(\mu - \alpha)}{1 - 2\alpha}\xi] > 0.$$

For this condition to hold at large enough $\xi$, we need that

$$e^*(1 - \nu(\mu)) + (1 - 2\alpha)(\mu - \alpha) \frac{\partial e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))}{\partial \nu} > 0.$$

This condition is Assumption 1.

**Proof of Proposition 2** In Case 3, $\beta$ is such that the leader fluctuates in their views often enough for there to be multiple stable steady states. Let

$$\varphi(\mu, \beta) = \beta e^*(\nu(\mu))[2\alpha - 1 + \xi(\mu + \alpha - 1)] + (1 - \beta) e^*(1 - \nu(\mu))[1 - 2\alpha + (\mu - \alpha)\xi].$$

Note that $\varphi(\mu, \beta)$ is increasing in $\mu$ and $\varphi(\mu, \beta) = 0$. Under Lemma 2, $\Delta(\mu)$ is increasing in $\mu$. Suppose there exists $\beta$ such that $\tilde{\mu}(\beta) \in [\mu_L, \mu_H]$. Then if $\mu > \tilde{\mu}(\beta)$ we have $\Delta(\mu) > 0$, and if $\mu < \tilde{\mu}(\beta)$ we have $\Delta(\mu) < 0$.

**Proof of Proposition 3** In general, with $\mu = 1$ the long-run expected payoff is

$$\beta \Pi(\lambda, \pi(0, 0), e^*(1)) + (1 - \beta) \Pi(\lambda, [\alpha \pi(1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(0, 1)], e^*(1 - \alpha)).$$

With $\mu = 0$ it is instead

$$\beta \Pi(\lambda, [\alpha \pi(0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi(1, 0)], e^*(1 - \alpha)) + (1 - \beta) \Pi(\lambda, \pi(1, 1), e^*(1)).$$
The payoff is higher (lower) with \( \mu = 1 \) \((\mu = 0)\) if and only if
\[
\beta \left[ \Pi (\lambda, \pi (0, 0), e^* (1)) - \Pi (\lambda, [\alpha \pi (0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (1, 0)], e^* (1 - \alpha)) \right] > (<) \\
(1 - \beta) \left[ \Pi (\lambda, \pi (1, 1), e^* (1)) - \Pi (\lambda, [\alpha \pi (1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (0, 1)], e^* (1 - \alpha)) \right].
\]
(22)

In the multiplicative case, this boils down to
\[
\beta \left[ \pi (0, 0) e^* (1) - [\alpha \pi (0, 0) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (1, 0)] e^* (1 - \alpha) \right] > (<) \\
(1 - \beta) \left[ \pi (1, 1) e^* (1) - [\alpha \pi (1, 1) + (1 - \alpha) \pi (0, 1)] e^* (1 - \alpha) \right]
\]
which yields the condition in the proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 4**  See the text in Subsection 6.2.

**Proof of Proposition 5**  The result follows from observing that, with \( \mu^A = 1 \) and \( \mu^B = 0, \theta = 0 \) implies
\[
W^{A^*} - W^{B^*} = e^* (1) - \alpha e^* (1 - \alpha) + \lambda (2 \alpha - 1)^2 - \lambda.
\]
This follows as party \( A \) will decentralize and have \( x_A = \alpha \), while party \( B \) will centralize and set \( \rho (0) = 0 \) with effort \( e^* (1 - \nu (0)) = e^* (1 - \alpha) \) and a fraction \( \alpha \) of local parties aligned with the state. A parallel argument says that with \( \theta = 1 \), then
\[
W^{A^*} - W^{B^*} = \alpha e^* (1 - \alpha) - e^* (1) + \lambda - \lambda (2 \alpha - 1)^2.
\]
Putting these together yields the result.